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A
DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
Being and Attributes
OF
G O D :

More Particularly in Answer to
Mr. HOBBS, SPINOZA,
And their Followers.

Wherein the Notion of *LIBERTY* is
Stated, and the Possibility and Certainty
of it Proved, in Opposition to *Necessity*
and *Fate*.

Being the Substance of Eight S E R M O N S
Preach'd at the Cathedral-Church of St. Paul, in
the Year 1704. at the Lecture Founded by the
Honourable ROBERT BOTLE Esq;

H. Clarke
By Samuel Clark, M.A. Chaplain to the Right Reve-
rend Father in God JOHN, Lord Bishop of
Norwich.

Rom. i. 20. *For the Invisible things of Him from the Creation
of the World, are clearly seen, being understood by the things
that are made; even his Eternal Power and God-head: So
that they are without excuse.*

London, Printed by W. Pitt, Botham; for James Knapton,
at the Crown in St. Paul's Church Yard. 1705.

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T O T H E

Most Reverend Father in God

T H O M A S

Lord Archbishop of *Canterbury* ;
and Primate of all *England* :

Sir **HENRY ASHURST**, Ba-
ronet.

Sir **JOHN ROTHERAM**, Knight,
Serjeant at Law ;

JOHN EVELIN, Esquire ;

Trustees Appointed by the Honou-
rable **ROBERT BOTLE**,
Esquire.

This Discourse is humbly De-
dicated.

Most Reverend Father in God

THOMAS

PROVOST

and Rector of all Churches

The King's High Court

SHIRAZ

and Rector of all Churches

and Rector of all Churches

and Rector of all Churches

and Rector of all Churches

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THE
PREFACE.

THere being already published many and good Books, to prove the Being and Attributes of God; I have chosen to contract, what was requisite for me to say upon this Subject, into as narrow a Compass; and to express what I had to offer, in as few Words as I could with Perspicuity. For which Reason I have also confined my self to One only Method or continued Thread of Arguing, which I have endeavoured should be as near to Mathematical as the Nature of such a Discourse would allow: Omitting some other Arguments, which I could not discern to be so evidently

THE PREFACE.

conclusive : Because it seems not to be at any time for the real Advantage of Truth, to use Arguments in its behalf, founded only on such Hypotheses, as the Adversaries apprehend they cannot be compelled to grant. Yet I have not made it my business, to oppose any of those Arguments ; because I think it is not the best way for a Man to recommend his own Performance by endeavouring to discover the Imperfections of Others, who are engaged in the same Design with himself, of promoting the Interest of true Religion and Virtue. But every Man ought to use such Arguments only, as appear to Him to be clear and strong, and the Readers must judge whether they truly prove the Conclusion.

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ERRATA.

Pag.	Line	Read
64	15	in Margin. Ocell. Lucan
104	9	impossible
127	15	perfection
204	9	possibly
209	18	in Margin. not inconsistent
210	12	to
221	20	insisted
224	22	proferest
235	15	exactly.

A
 DEMONSTRATION
 OF THE
 Being and Attributes
 OF
 G O D:

More particularly in Answer to
 Mr. *Hobbs*, *Spinoza*, and their
 Followers.

ALL those who either *The In-*
 are or pretend to be *troducti-*
Atheists; who either *on.*
 disbelieve the Being of
 God, or would be thought to do
 so; or, which is all one, who
 deny the Principal Attributes of
 the Divine Nature, and suppose
 B God

A Demonstration of the

God to be an Unintelligent Being, which acts merely by Necessity ; that is, which, in any tolerable Propriety of Speech, acts not at all, but is only acted upon : All Men that are *Atheists*, I say, in this Sense, must be so upon one or other of these three Accounts.

*Atheism
arises
from stu-
pid Igno-
rance :*

Either, *First*, because being extremely ignorant and stupid, they have never duly considered any thing, nor made any just use of their natural Reason, to discover even the plainest and most obvious Truths ; but have spent their time in a manner of Life very little Superiour to that of Beasts.

*Or from
gross
Corrupti-
on of
Manners :*

Or, *Secondly*, because being totally debauched and corrupted in their Practice, they have, by a vicious and degenerate Life, corrupted the Principles of their Nature, and defaced the Reason of their own Minds ;

Being and Attributes of God. 3

Minds ; and instead of fairly and impartially enquiring into the Rules and Obligations of Nature , and the Reason and Fitness of Things, have accustomed themselves only to mock and scoff at Religion ; and being under the Power of Evil Habits, and the Slavery of Unreasonable and Indulged Lusts, are resolved not to hearken to any Reasoning which would oblige them to forsake their beloved Vices.

Or, *Thirdly*, because in the way ^{Or from false Phi-} of Speculative Reasoning, and upon the Principles of Philosophy, the Arguments used against the Being or Attributes of God, seem to them, after the strictest and fullest Inquiry, to be more strong and conclusive, than those by which we endeavour to prove these great Truths.

A Demonstration of the

These seem the only Causes that can be imagined, of any Man's disbelieving the Being or Attributes of God; and no Man can be suppos'd to be an Atheist, but upon one or other of these three Accounts. Now to the two former of these three sorts of Men; namely, to such as are wholly ignorant and stupid, or to such as through habitual Debauchery have brought themselves to a Custom of mocking and scoffing at all Religion, and will not hearken to any fair Reasoning; it is not my *present* Business to apply myself. The One of these wants to be instructed in the first Principles of *Reason*, as well as of *Religion*: The Other disbelieves only for a present false *Interest*, and because he is desirous that the Thing should not be true. The One has *not yet arrived* to the use of his Natural Faculties: The other has

Being and Attributes of God.

5

has renounced them, and declares he will not be argued with, as a Rational Creature. 'Tis therefore the third sort of Atheists only, namely those who in the Way of Speculative Reasoning, and upon the Principles of Philosophy, pretend that the Arguments brought against the Being or Attributes of God, do, upon the strictest and fullest Examination, appear to them to be more strong and conclusive, than those by which these great Truths are attempted to be proved: These, I say, are the only Atheistical Persons, to whom my present Discourse can be supposed to be directed, or indeed who are capable of being reasoned with at all.

Now before I enter upon the main Argument, I shall premise several Concessions, which these

B 3

Men,

A Demonstration of the

Men, upon their own Principles, are unavoidably obliged to make.

*The Being of
God very
desirable.*

And, *First*, they must of necessity own, that supposing it cannot be proved to be true, yet at least 'tis a thing very desirable, and which any wise Man would wish to be true, for the great Benefit and Happiness of Men; that there was a God, an Intelligent and Wise, a Just and Good Being, to govern the World. Whatever Hypothesis these Men can possibly frame; whatever Argument they can invent, by which they would exclude God and Providence out of the World; That very Argument or Hypothesis will of necessity lead them to this Concession. If they argue, that our Notion of God arises not from Nature and Reason, but from the Art and Contrivance of Politicians; that

Being and Attributes of God.

7

that Argument it self forces them to confess, that 'tis manifestly for the Interest of Humane Society, that it should be believed there is a God. If they suppose that the World was made by Chance, and is every Moment subject to be destroyed by Chance again ; no Man can be so absurd as to contend, that 'tis as comfortable and desirable to live in such an uncertain State of things, and * so continually liable to Ruin, without any Hope of Renovation ; as in a World that were under the Preservation and Conduct of a Powerful, Wise and Good God. If they argue against the Being of God, from the Faults and Defects which they imagine they can find in the Frame and Constituti-

* Maria ac Terras Cælumq;

Una dies dabit exitio,
multosq; per annos
Sustentata ruet moles &
machina Mundi.

—Dictis dabit ipsa fidem res

Forſitan, & graviter terrarum motibus orbis
Omnia conquassari in
parvo tempore cernes.

Lucret. Lib. 5.

on of the *Visible* and *Material* World; this Supposition obliges them to acknowledge, that it would have been better the World had been made by an Intelligent and Wise Being, who might have prevented all Faults and Imperfections. If they argue against Providence, from the Faultiness and Inequality which they think they discover in the Management of the *Moral* World; this is a plain Confession, that 'tis a thing more fit and desirable in it self, that the World should be governed by a Just and Good Being, than by mere Chance or Unintelligent Necessity. Lastly, If they suppose the World to be eternally and necessarily Self-Existent, and consequently that every thing in it is established by a Blind and Eternal Fatality; No rational Man can at the same time deny, but that Liberty and Choice,
or

Being and Attributes of God.

9

or a Free Power of Acting, is a more eligible State, than to be determined thus in all our Actions, as a Stone is to move downward, by an absolute and inevitable Fate. In a word, which way soever they turn themselves, and whatever Hypothesis they make, concerning the Original and Frame of things : Nothing is so certain and undeniable, as that *Man*, considered without the Protection and Conduct of a Superiour Being, is in a far worse Case, than upon Supposition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection and Favour. *Man* of himself is infinitely insufficient for his own Happiness : * *He is liable* * *Archb.* *to many Evils and Miseries, which* Tillot-
he can neither prevent nor redress : son's Ser-
He is full of Wants which he can- mon on
not supply, and compassed about Job 28.
with 28.

A Demonstration of the

with Infirmities which he cannot remove, and obnoxious to Dangers which he can never sufficiently provide against : He is secure of nothing that he enjoys in this World, and uncertain of every thing that he hopes for : He is apt to grieve for what he cannot help, and eagerly to desire what he is never likely to obtain, &c. Under which evil Circumstances 'tis manifest there can be no sufficient Support, but in the Belief of a Wise and Good God, and in the Hopes which true Religion affords. Whether therefore the Being and Attributes of God can be demonstrated or not; it must at least be confessed by all rational and wise Men, to be a thing very Desirable, and which they would heartily Wish to be true, that there were a God, an Intelligent and Wise, a Just and Good Being, to Govern the World,

Now

Being and Attributes of God. I I

Now the use I desire to make of this Concession, is only this: That since the Men I am arguing with, are unavoidably obliged to confess, that 'tis a thing very desirable at least, that there should be a God; they must of necessity, upon their own Principles, be very willing, nay, desirous above all things, to be convinced that their present Opinion is an Errour, and sincerely hope that the contrary may be demonstrated to them to be true; and consequently they are bound with all seriousness, attention and impartiality, to consider the weight of the Arguments, by which the Being and Attributes of God may be proved to them.

Secondly, All such Persons as I ^{*Scorning*} am speaking of, who profess them- ^{*at Reli-*} selves to be Atheists, not upon ^{*gion, in-*} any present Interest or Lust, but ^{*excusable,*} purely upon the Principles of
Rea-

A Demonstration of the

Reason and Philosophy ; are bound by these Principles to acknowledge, that all mocking and scoffing at Religion, all Jestings and turning Arguments of Reason into Drollery and Ridicule, is the most unmanly and unreasonable thing in the World : And consequently they are obliged to exclude out of their Number, as Irrational and Self-condemned Persons, and unworthy to be argued with, all such Scoffers at Religion, who deride at a venture, without hearing Reason, and will not use the Means of being convinced and satisfied. Hearing the Reason of the Case with Patience and Unprejudicedness, is an Equity which Men owe to every Truth that can concern them, and which is necessary to the Discovery of *every Kind of Error* : How much more in things of the utmost Importance !

Thirdly,

Being and Attributes of God. 13

Thirdly, Since the Persons I am ^{Virtue} discoursing to, cannot but own, ^{and good} that the Supposition of the Being ^{Manners} of God, is in it self most desirable, ^{absolutely} and for the benefit of the World, ^{necessary.} that it should be true ; They must of Necessity grant further, that supposing the Being and Attributes of God, to be Things not indeed Demonstrable to be true, but only *Possible*, and such as cannot be demonstrated to be false ; as most certainly they cannot : And much more, supposing them once made to appear *Probable*, and but more likely to be true, than the contrary Opinion : Nothing is more evident, even upon these Suppositions only, than that Men ought in all Reason to live piously and virtuously in the World ; and that Vice and Immorality are, upon all Accounts, and under all Hypotheses, the most absurd

A Demonstration of the
furd and inexcusable Things in
Nature.

Thus much being premised, which no Atheist who pretends to be a rational and Fair Inquirer into Things, can possibly avoid granting; (and other Atheists, I have before said, are not to be disputed with at all, as being Enemies to *Reason*, no less than to *Religion*, and therefore absolutely Self-condemned :) I proceed now to the main Thing I at first proposed to my self; namely, to endeavour to show, to such considering Persons as I have already described, that the Being and Attributes of God, are not only possible or barely probable in themselves, but also strictly demonstrable to any unprejudiced Mind from the most uncontestable Principles of Reason.

And

Being and Attributes of God. 15

And here, because the Persons I am at present dealing with, must be supposed not to Believe any Revelation, nor acknowledge any Authority which they will submit to, but only the bare force of Reasoning : I shall not, at this time, draw any Testimony from Scripture, nor make use of any sort of Authorities, nor lay any stress upon any popular Arguments in the Matter before us ; but confine my self to the Rules of strict and demonstrative Argumentation.

Now many Arguments there are, by which the Being and Attributes of God have been undertaken to be *Demonstrated* : And perhaps most of those Arguments, if thoroughly understood, rightly stated, fully pursued, and duly separated from the false or uncertain Reasonings, which have sometimes

times been intermix'd with them, would at length appear to be substantial and conclusive. But because I would endeavour, as far as possible, to avoid all manner of perplexity and confusion ; therefore I shall not at this Time use any Variety of Arguments, but endeavour by One clear and plain Series of Propositions necessarily connected and following one from another, to demonstrate the Certainty of the Being of God, and to deduce in order the Necessary Attributes of his Nature, so far as by our Finite Reason we are enabled to discover and apprehend them : And because it is not to my present purpose to explain or illustrate things to Them that Believe, but only to convince Unbelievers, and settle them that Doubt, by strict and undeniable Reasoning ; therefore I shall not
allege

Being and Attributes of God. 17

allege any thing, which however really true and useful, may yet be liable to contradiction or dispute ; but shall endeavour to urge such Propositions only, as cannot be denied without departing from that Reason, which all Atheists pretend to be the Foundation of their Unbelief. Only it is absolutely Necessary before all Things, that they yield to lay aside all manner of Prejudices ; and especially such, as have been apt to arise from the too frequent Use of *Terms of Art* which have no *Ideas* belonging to them, and from the common receiving certain *Maxims of Philosophy* as true, which at the bottom seem to be only *Propositions without any meaning or Signification at all.*

*Some-
thing
must have
Existed
from E-
ternity.*

I. First then, it is Absolutely and Undeniably certain, that *Something has existed from all Eternity.* This is so evident and undeniable a Proposition, that no Atheist in any Age has ever presumed to assert the contrary; and therefore there is little need of being particular in the Proof of it. For since Something Now Is; 'tis manifest that Something always Was: Otherwise the Things that Now Are, must have risen out of Nothing, absolutely and without Cause: Which is a flat Contradiction in Terms: For to say a Thing is produced, and yet that there is no Cause at all of that Production, is to say that Something is *Effected* when it is *Effected* by *Nothing*, that is, at the same time when it is *not Effected* at all. Whatever Exists, has a Cause of its Existence, either in the Necessity

Being and Attributes of God. 19

sity of its own Nature; and then it must have been Eternal: Or in the Will of some other Being; and then that Other Being must, at least in the Order of Nature and Causality, have Existed before it.

That *Something* therefore *has* ^{Of the} *really Existed from Eternity*, is one ^{Difficul-} *of the certainest and most evident* ^{ty of Con-} *Truths in the World; acknow-* ^{ceiving} *ledged by all Men, and disputed* ^{Eternity.} *by none.* Yet as to the *Manner* How it can be; there is nothing in Nature more difficult for the Mind of Man to conceive, than this very first Plain and Self-evident Truth. For, *How an Eternal Duration can Now be actually Past*, is a thing utterly as impossible for our narrow Understandings to comprehend, as any thing that is not an exprefs Contradiction *in Terms*, can be imagined to be:

A Demonstration of the

and yet to deny the Truth of the Proposition, would be to assert *something still far more Unintelligible.*

Difficulties arising merely from the Nature of Eternity, not to be regarded, because equal in all Suppositions.

The use I would make of this Observation, is This. That since in all Questions concerning the Nature and Perfections of God, or concerning any Thing to which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joyned; tho' we can indeed Demonstrate certain Propositions to be true; yet it is impossible for us to comprehend or frame any adæquate or complete Ideas of the Manner *How* the Things so demonstrated can Be: Therefore when once any Proposition is clearly Demonstrated to be true; it ought not to disturb us, that there be perhaps perplexing Objections on the other side, which for want of adæquate Ideas of the Manner of the Existence of the Things demonstrated, are not easy to be answered.

Indeed,

Being and Attributes of God. 21

Indeed, were it possible there should be any Proposition which could equally be *Demonstrated* on both sides of the Question, or which could on both sides be *reduced to imply a Contradiction*; This it must be confessed, would alter the Case: Upon this absurd Supposition, all Difference of True and False, all Thinking and Reasoning, and the use of all our Faculties, would be entirely at an end. But when to Demonstration on the one side, there are opposed on the other, only Objections raised from our want of having adæquate Ideas of the Things themselves; this ought not to be esteemed a Real Difficulty. 'Tis positively and clearly Demonstrable, that Something has been from Eternity: All the Objections therefore raised against the Eternity of any thing, grounded merely on our want of

C 3

having

A Demonstration of the

having an adæquate Idea of Eternity ; ought to be looked upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the like Instances : 'Tis Demonstrable, for Example, that Something must be actually Infinite : All the Metaphysical Difficulties therefore, which arise usually from applying the Measures and Relations of Things Finite to what is Infinite ; and from supposing *Finites* to be *Parts of Infinite*, when indeed they are not properly so, but only as Mathematical Points to Quantity, which have no Proportion at all ; ought to be esteemed vain and of no Force. Again, 'tis in like manner Demonstrable, that Quantity is infinitely Divisible : All the Objections therefore raised by comparing the imaginary *Equality or Inequality of the Number of the Parts of Unequal Quantities*, whose Parts have really no

Num-

Number at all, they all having Parts *without Number* ; ought to be lookt upon as weak and altogether Inconclusive : To ask whether the Parts of unequal Quantities be *equal in Number* or not, when they have *no Number at all* ; being the same thing as to ask whether two infinite Lines be equal in length or not, that is, whether they *End* together, when neither of them have *any End at all*.

II. *There has Existed from Eter-* ^{There}
nity Some One Unchangeable and ^{must have}
Independent Being. For since Some- ^{existed}
thing must needs have been from ^{from E-}
Eternity ; as hath been already ^{ternity}
proved, and is granted on all ^{One In-}
Hands : Either there has always ^{depen-}
Existed One Unchangeable and In-
dependent Being, from which all
other Beings that are or ever were

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in the Universe, have received their Original; or else there has been an infinite Succession of changeable and *dependent* Beings, produced one from another in an endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all: Which latter Supposition is so very absurd, that tho' all Atheism must in its Account of most Things (as shall be shown hereafter) terminate in it, yet I think very few Atheists ever were so weak as openly and directly to defend it. For it is plainly impossible and Contradictory to it self. I shall not argue against it from the supposed Impossibility of Infinite Succession, *barely and absolutely considered in it self*; for a Reason which shall be mentioned hereafter: But, if we consider such an infinite Progression, as *One entire Endless Series of Dependent Beings*; 'tis plain this whole Se-

ries

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ries of Beings can have no Cause from without, of its Existence ; because in it are supposed to be included *All Things* that are or ever were in the Universe : And 'tis plain it can have no Reason *within it self*, of its Existence ; because no One Being in this Infinite Succession is supposed to be Self-existent or *Necessary* (which is the only Ground or Reason of Existence of any thing, that can be imagined *within the thing it self*, as will presently more fully appear,) but every one *Dependent* on the foregoing : and where *no Part* is necessary, 'tis manifest *the whole* cannot be necessary ; absolute Necessity of Existence, not being an outward, relative, and accidental Determination ; but an inward and essential Property of the Nature of the Thing which so Exists. An infinite Succession therefore of
merely

merely *Dependent* Beings, without any Original Independent Cause ; is a *Series* of Beings, that has neither Necessity nor Cause, nor any Reason *at all* of its Existence, neither *within it self* nor *from without* : that is, 'tis an express Contradiction and Impossibility ; 'tis a supposing *Something* to be *caused*, (because it's granted in every one of its Stages of Succession, not to be necessarily and from it self ;) and yet that in the whole it is caused *absolutely by Nothing* : Which every Man knows is a Contradiction to be done *in Time* ; and because Duration in this Case makes no Difference, 'tis equally a Contradiction to suppose it done from Eternity : And consequently there must *on the contrary*, of Necessity have Existed from Eternity, some *One* Immutable and *Independent* Being : Which, what it is, remains in the next place to be inquired.

III. *That*

III. *That Unchangeable and In-* The One
dependent Being, which has Existed Indepen-
from Eternity, without any external dent Be-
Cause of its Existence; must be ing, must
Self-existent, that is, Necessarily be neces-
existing. sarily
 For whatever Exists, Existing.
 must either have come into Being
 out of Nothing, absolutely with-
 out Cause; or it must have been
 produced by some External Cause;
 or it must be Self-Existent. Now
 to arise out of Nothing, absolute-
 ly without any Cause; has been
 already shown to be a plain contra-
 diction. To have been produced
 by some External Cause, cannot
 possibly be true of every thing;
 but Something must have Existed
 Eternally and Independently; as
 has likewise been shown already.
 It remains therefore, that That Be-
 ing which has existed Independent-
 ly from Eternity, must of Necessi-
 ty

ty be Self-existent. Now to be *Self-existent*, is not, *to be Produced by it self*; for that is an express Contradiction: But it is, (which is the only Idea we can frame of Self-existence, and without which the Word seems to have no Signification at all: It is, I say,) *to exist by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self*. And this Necessity must be *Antecedent*; not indeed in time, to the Existence of the Being it self; because That is Eternal: but it must be *Antecedent* in the Natural Order of our Ideas, to our Supposition of its Being: That is; This Necessity must not barely be *consequent* upon our Supposition of the Existence of such a Being: (For then it could not be a Necessity Absolutely such in it self, nor consequently the Ground or Foundation of the Existence of any thing, being

being on the contrary only a Consequent of it;) But it must *antecedently* force it self upon us, whether we will or no, even when we are indeavouring to suppose that no such Being Exists: The attempting which very Supposition, because it is an Impossible One, does of all other ways the most clearly evidence to us the Absoluteness of this Necessity, Antecedent to any Supposition whatsoever: For when we are indeavouring to suppose that there is no Being in the Universe that exists Necessarily; we always find in our Minds (besides the foregoing Demonstration of Something being Self-existent, from the Impossibility of every Things being dependent; We always find in our Minds, I say,) some Ideas, as of Infinity and Eternity: which to remove, that is, to suppose that there

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is no Being in the Universe to which these Attributes are necessarily inherent, is a Contradiction in the very Terms. For He that can suppose Eternity and Immensity removed out of the Universe, may, if he please, as easily remove the Relation of Equality between twice two and four.

From hence it follows.

*The True
Notion
of Self-
Exist-
ence.*

1st. That the only true Idea of a Self-existent or Necessarily Existing Being, is the Idea of a Being, the Supposition of whose Non-existence is an express Contradiction. For since 'tis absolutely impossible but that there must be Somewhat Self-existent; that is, which exists by the Necessity of its own Nature; 'tis plain, that That Necessity cannot be a Necessity consequent upon any foregoing Supposition, (because Nothing can be Antecedent to that which is Self-Existent, no
not

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not its own Will, so as to be the Cause of its own Existence,) but it must be a Necessity absolutely such in its own Nature. Now a Necessity, not relatively or consequentially, but absolutely such in its own Nature ; is nothing else, but a plain Impossibility or Implying a Contradiction to suppose the contrary. For instance ; the Relation of Equality between twice two and four, is an absolute Necessity ; only because it is an immediate Contradiction in Terms to suppose them unequal. This is the only Idea we can frame, of an Absolute Necessity ; and to use the Word in any other Sense, seems to be using it without any Signification at all.

If any one now asks, what sort of Idea the Idea of that Being is, the Supposition of whose Non-
Existence

Existence is thus an exprefs Contradiction : I answer, 'Tis the First and Simplest Idea we can possibly frame, or rather which (unless we forbear thinking at all) we cannot possibly extirpate or remove out of our Minds, of *a most Simple Being, absolutely Eternal and Infinite, Original and Independent*. For, that he who supposes, there is no *Original Independent* Being in the Universe, supposes a Contradiction ; has been shown already : And that he who supposes there may possibly be no *Eternal and Infinite* Being in the Universe, supposes likewise a Contradiction, is evident from hence ; (besides that these two Attributes do necessarily follow from Independent Existence, as shall be shown hereafter :) that when he has done his utmost, in indeavouring to imagine that no such Being Exists; he cannot

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cannot avoid imagining an Eternal and Infinite Nothing; that is, he will imagine Eternity and Immenfity removed out of the Universe, and yet that at the same time they still continue there.

This Argument, the *Cartesians*, ^{The Error of the Cartesians.} who supposed the Idea of Immenfity to be the Idea of mere Matter, have been mightily perplexed with.

For (however *in Words* they have contradicted themselves, yet in *Reality*) it has been easier for them to be driven even to that most intolerable Absurdity, of

asserting Matter * to be

in effect a Necessary

Being, than to be able

to remove out of their

Minds the Idea of Im-

menfity, as Existing

Necessarily and insepa-

rably from Eternity.

Which Absurdity of

* *Mais peut etre que je raisonne mal, &c. i.e.* But perhaps I argue ill when I conclude that the Property my Idea hath to represent Extension, [that is, in the Sense of the Cartesians, Matter] comes from Extension it self as its Cause; For what hinders me from believing that it

D

theirs

this Property comes not from my self, yet at least it may come from some Spirit [*or Being*] Superiour to me, which produces in Me the Idea of Extension, though Extension does not actually exist? Yet when I consider the thing attentively, I find that my Conclusion is good; and that no Spirit [*or Being*] how excellent soever, can cause the Idea which I have of Extension to represent to me Extension rather than any thing else, if Extension does not actually Exist; because if he should do so, the Idea which I should then have of Extension, would not be a representation of Extension, but a representation of Nothing; which is impossible.

But it may be I still deceive my self, when I say that the Idea I have of Extension, supposes an Object actually existing; For it seems that I have Ideas, which do not suppose any Object; I have, for example the Idea of an Enchanted Castle; though no such thing really Exists. Yet when I consider the difficulty still more attentively; I find there is this difference between the Idea of Extension, and that of an Enchanted Castle; that the first being natural, that is, independent on my Will, supposes an Object which is necessarily such as it represents; whereas the other being artificial, supposes indeed an Object, but it is not necessary that That Object be absolutely such as the Idea represents, because my Will can add to that Object, or diminish from it, as it pleases; as I have before said, and as shall be proved hereafter, when I come to treat of the Origin of Ideas. *Regis*
Metaphys. Lib. I. Par. 1. Chap. 3. *ved*

theirs, in respect of the Idea of Immensity, proves It indeed to be Necessary and impossible to be remo-

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ved ; but, in respect of *Matter*, 'tis only a perverse applying an Idea to an Object whereto it no ways belongs : For, that it is indeed absolutely impossible and contradictory to suppose *Matter* necessarily-existing, shall be demonstrated presently.

2dly. From hence it follows, *Nothing* That there is no Man whatsoever, ^{so certain} who makes any use of his Reason, ^{as the} Existence but may easily become more certain of ^{of a Supreme In-} the Being of a Supreme Independent ^{dependent} Cause, than he can be of any Thing ^{Cause,} else besides his own Existence. For how much Thought soever it may require to demonstrate the Other Attributes of such a Being, as it may do to demonstrate the greatest Mathematical Certainties; (of which more hereafter :) Yet as to its Existence; that there Is Somewhat Eternal, Infinite, and Self-existing, which must be the Cause and Original of

all other Things ; this is one of the First and most natural Conclusions, that any Man, who thinks at all, can frame in his Mind : And no Man can any more doubt of this, than he can doubt whether twice two be equal to four. 'Tis possible indeed a Man may in some Sense be ignorant of this first and plain Truth, by being utterly stupid, and not thinking at all : (For though it is absolutely impossible for him to imagine the contrary, yet he may possibly neglect to conceive this : Though no Man can possibly think that twice two is not four, yet he may possibly be stupid, and never have thought at all whether it be so or not :) But this I say ; There is no Man, who thinks or reasons at all, but may easily become more certain, that there is Something Eternal, Infinite, and Self-existent ;

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ing; than he can be certain of any Thing else.

3dly, Hence we may observe, ^{Of the} That Our first Certainty of the Exi- ^{Idea of} stence of God, arises not from this, ^{God in-} that in the Idea we frame of him in ^{cluding} our own Minds, or rather in the ^{Self-ex-} Definition that we make of the ^{istence.} Word, [God,] as signifying a Being of all possible Perfections, we include Self-Existence; but from hence, that 'tis demonstrable both Negative-ly, that neither can All Things have arisen out of Nothing, nor can they have depended one on another in an endless Succession; and also positive-ly, that there is Something in the Universe, actually existing without us, the Supposition of whose Non-Existence plainly implies a Contradiction. I do not mean to say positively, that the Argument drawn from our including Self-Existence in the Idea of God, or

our comprehending it in the *Definition* or *Notion* we frame of him, is wholly inconclusive and ineffectual to prove his actual Existence. Possibly by a very nice and accurate Deduction, it may be found to be a Satisfactory Proof. But that it is not a Clear and Obvious Demonstration, fitted to convince and put the Atheist to Silence ; appears from the endless Disputes maintained by Learned Men concerning it, without being able to satisfy each other on either side of the Question. The Obscurity and Defect of that Argument, seems to lie in this ; that it extends only to the *Nominal Idea* or *Definition* of a Self-existent Being, and does not with a sufficiently evident Connexion refer and apply that *Nominal Idea, Definition, or Notion* which we frame in our own Mind, to the *Real Idea* of a Being

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Being *actually existing without us*,
For it is not Satisfactory, that I
have in my Mind an Idea of the
Proposition; *There exists a Being*,
indued with all Possible Perfections;
Or, *There Is a Self-existent Being*:
But I must have also an Idea of *the*
Thing. I must have an Idea of
Something actually existing without
me; and I must see wherein con-
sists the Absolute Impossibility of
removing that Idea, and consequent-
ly of supposing the Non-existence of
the Thing; before I can be satisfi-
ed from that Idea, that the Thing
actually exists. The bare having
an Idea of the Proposition, *There*
Is a Self-existent Being, proves in-
deed the Thing not to be impos-
sible: (For of an impossible Pro-
position there is properly no Idea:)
But that it actually Is, cannot be
proved from the Idea; unless the
Certainty of the Actual Existence of

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a Necessarily-existing Being, follows from the *Possibility* of the Existence of such a Being : Which that it does, in this particular Case, many Learned Men have indeed thought ; and it is not easie to disprove ; because, it must be confessed, there is something very singular in the Idea of Necessary Existence : It being evident that if Necessary Existence be, (as it undeniably is) a *Possible Perfection*, it will consequently belong *actually* to a Being indued with *All Possible Perfections* ; and if it *actually* belongs to such a Being, it will be absolutely impossible that such a Being should *not Exist* ; and from hence it seems to follow, that it must Necessarily be true, that such a Being *actually* Exists. This, I say, is *not* indeed *easie to disprove*. But it is a *Clearer and more Convincing* way of Arguing, to demonstrate

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strate, that there does actually exist without us a Being, whose Existence is Necessary and of it self; from the manifest Contradiction contained in the contrary Supposition; (as I have before shown;) and from the absolute Impossibility of destroying some Ideas, as of Eternity and Immensity; which therefore must needs be the Attributes of a Necessary Being actually existing. For if I have an Idea of a Thing, and cannot possibly in my Imagination take away the Idea of that Thing as actually Existing, any more than I can change or take away the Idea of the Equality of twice two to four; the Certainty of the Existence of that Thing, is the same, and stands on the same Foundation, as the Certainty of the other Relation: For the Relation of Equality between twice two and four, has no other Certainty but this, that I cannot

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cannot, without a Contradiction, change or take away the Idea of that Relation. We are Certain therefore of the Being of a Supreme Independent Cause; because 'tis strictly demonstrable, that there is Something in the Universe, actually existing without us, the Supposition of whose Non-existence plainly implies a Contradiction.

That the Material World cannot possibly be the Self-Existent Being. 4thly, From hence it follows, that *The material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent, and of it self Eternal.* For since it hath been already demonstrated, that whatever Being hath Existed from Eternity, Independent, and without any External Cause of its Existence; must be Self-Existent: And that whatever is Self-Existent, must Exist Necessarily, by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self: It follows evidently,

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dently, that unless the Material World Exists Necessarily, by an Absolute Necessity in its own Nature, so as that it must be an Express Contradiction to suppose it not to Exist; it cannot be Independent, and of it self Eternal. Now that the Material World does not Exist thus necessarily, is very Evident. For Absolute Necessity of Existing, and a Possibility of not Existing, being Contradictory Ideas; 'tis manifest the Material World cannot Exist Necessarily, if without a Contradiction we can Conceive it either Not to Be, or to be in any Respect otherwise than it Now is. Than which Nothing is more easy. For whether we Consider the *Form* of the World, with the *Disposition* and *Motion* of its Parts; or whether we consider the *Matter* of it, as such, without respect to

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to its present Form; every Thing in it, both the *Whole* and every one of its *Parts*, their *Situation* and *Motion*, the *Form* and also the *Matter*, are the most Arbitrary and Dependent Things, and the farthest removed from Necessity, that can possibly be imagined. A Necessity indeed of *Fitness*, that is, a Necessity that Things should be as they are, in order to the *Well-being* of the whole, there may be in all these Things: But an Absolute Necessity of *Nature* in any of them, (which is what the Atheist must maintain) there is not the least appearance of. If any Man will say in this Sense, (as every Atheist must do,) either that the *Form* of the World, or at least the *Matter* and *Motion* of it, is necessary; Nothing can possibly be invented more Absurd.

If

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If he says that the particular *Form* ^{The} is Necessary ; he must affirm it to ^{Form of} be a Contradiction ^{the} to suppose that ^{World} any Part of the World can be in ^{not neces-} any Respect otherwise than it now ^{sary.} is : It must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose more or fewer Stars, more or fewer Planets, or to suppose their Size, Figure or Motion, Different from what it now is ; or to suppose more or fewer Plants and Animals upon Earth, or the present ones of different Shape and Bigness from what they now are : In all which things there is the greatest Arbitrariness, in respect of Power and Possibility, that can be imagined ; however necessary any of them may be, in respect of Wisdom, and Preservation of the Beauty and Order of the whole.

If the Atheist will say, that the ^{Nor its} Motion in general of all Matter is ne- ^{Motion:} cessary :

cessary: It follows that it must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any matter to be at Rest; Which is so absurd and ridiculous, that I think hardly any Atheists, either Antient or Modern, have presumed directly to suppose it.

* Mr.
Toland
Let. III.

One late * Author indeed has ventur'd to assert, and pretended to prove, that *Motion*, that is, the *Conatus to Motion*, is essential to all Matter: But how Philosophically, may appear from this One Consideration. The essential *Conatus to Motion* of every one or of any one Particle of Matter in this Author's imaginary infinite *Plenum*, must be either a *Conatus* to move some one determinate way at once, or to move every way at once: A *Conatus* to move some one determinate way, cannot be essential to any Particle of Matter, but must arise from some External Cause;

Cause ; because there is nothing in the pretended Necessary Nature of any Particle, to determine its Motion necessarily and essentially one way rather than another : And a *Conatus* equally to move every way at once, is either an absolute Contradiction, or at least could produce nothing in Matter but an Eternal Rest of all and every one of its Parts. But to proceed.

If the Atheist will suppose Motion necessary and essential to *some* Matter, but not to *all* : The same Absurdity as to the Determination of Motion, still follows ; and now he moreover supposes an Absolute Necessity not Universal ; that is, that it shall be a Contradiction to suppose some certain Matter at Rest, tho' at the same time some other Matter actually be so.

If he only affirms bare *Mat-* *Nor the*
ter to be Necessary : Then, *bare*
Matter.
besides

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besides the extreme Folly of his attributing *Motion* and the *Form* of the World to Chance ; (which Opinion I think all Atheists have now given up ; and therefore I shall not think my self obliged to take any Notice of it in the Sequel of this Discourse ;) it may be demonstrated thus, (out of many the like Arguments that might be drawn from the Nature and Affections of the Thing it self) that bare Matter is not a Necessary Being. If bare Matter be the Necessarily-existing Being, (for that there can be but *One* such, shall be proved hereafter ;) then in that Necessary Existence there is either included the Power of Gravitation, or not : If not, then in a World *merely Material*, and in which no *Intelligent Being* presides, there never could have been any Motion ; because Motion, as has been
been

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been already shewn, and is now granted in the Question, is not Necessary of it self : But if the Power of Gravitation be included in the Necessary Existence of Matter ; (which yet is impossible, because the Idea of Gravitation is separable from that of Matter, and Matter may be conceived without it ;) then it is included either in the Necessary Existence of All Matter , or of Some only : If of Some only, then Matter is not a Similar Being, and consequently not Necessary : For in Absolute Necessity, there can be no variety, any more than there can be Degrees. But if Gravitation be an Universal Quality or Affection of *All Matter* ; then there is a Vacuum ; (as is abundantly demonstrated by Mr. *Newton* :) And if there be a Vacuum, then Matter is not a Necessary Being ;

E

For

For 'tis more than possible for it, not to Be. If an Atheist will yet Assert, that Matter may be necessary, though not necessary to be every where : I answer ; this is an express Contradiction : For *absolute* Necessity, is absolute Necessity every where alike : And if it be no Impossibility for Matter to be absent from one Place, 'tis no Impossibility (absolutely in the Nature of the Thing ; For no Relative or Consequential Necessity, can have any Room in this Argument : 'Tis no absolute Impossibility, I say, in the Nature of the Thing,) that Matter should be absent from any other Place, or from every Place.

Spinoza's Opinion confuted.

Spinoza, the most celebrated Patron of Atheism in our Time, who

* Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. *Ethic*, Par. I. Prop. 6.

taught that * there is no Difference of Substances ; but that the Whole

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Whole and every Part of the *Material World* is a Necessarily-existing Being; and that † there is no other God, but the Universe: That he might seemingly avoid the manifold Absurdities of that Opinion; endeavours by an Ambiguity of Expression in the Progress of his Discourse, to elude the Arguments by which he foresaw his Assertion would be confuted: For, having at first plainly asserted, that *

Omnis substantia est necessario infinita. *Ibid. Prop. 8.*

Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. *Ibid. Prop. 7.*

† Præter Deum nulla dari neq; concipi potest substantia. *Ibid. Prop. 14.*

All Substance is Necessarily-existing; he

* Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. *Prop. 7.*

would afterward seem to explain it away, by asserting, that

the Reason why every thing || ex-
Res nullo alio modo

do, neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

Ex Necessitate Divinæ Naturæ, infinita infinitis modis, (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt) sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

ists necessarily, and could not possibly have been in any respect different from what it Now is, is because every thing flows from the *Necessity of the Divine Nature*. By which if the unwary Reader understands, that he means things are therefore Necessarily such as they are, because Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could not possibly make Things but in that Order which is Fittest and Wisest in the Whole; he is very much mistaken: For such a Necessity, is not a Natural, but only a Moral and Consequential Necessity; and directly contrary to the Author's true Intention. Further, if the Reader hereby understands, that God was determined, not by a Necessity of Wisdom and Goodness, but by a mere Natural Necessity, exclusive of Will and Choice, to make all Things just as they now are; nei-
ther

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ther is this the whole of *Spinoza's* meaning : For this, as absurd as it is, is still supposing God, as a Substance distinct from the Material World ; which * He expressly de-^{* Loc. supra citatis.} nies. Nay further, if any one thinks his meaning to be, that all Substances in the World, are only Modifications of the Divine Essence ; neither is This *All* : For thus God may still be supposed as an Agent, acting upon *himself* at least, and manifesting *himself* in different manners, according to his own Will : Which † *Spinoza* expressly denies. But his true meaning therefore, however darkly and ambiguously he sometimes speaks, must be this ; and if he means any thing at all consistent with himself, can be no other than this : That,

E 3 since

† Deum non operari
ex libertate voluntatis.
Prop. 32. Corol. 1. &
Scholium ad Prop. 17.

* Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia *Prop. 6.*

† Res nullo alio modo neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

|| Præter Deum nulla dari, neq; concipi potest substantia. *Prop. 14.*

* Deum non operari ex Libertate voluntatis. *Prop. 32. Coroll. 1.*

† Nullo alio Modo, neq; Ordine, &c.

since it is absolutely * impossible for any thing to be created or produced by another; and † also absolutely impossible for God to have caused any thing to be in any respect

different from what it now is ; every thing that exists, must needs

be so a || Part of the Divine Substance, not as a Modification caused in it by any

* Will or Good-Pleasure or Wisdom in the whole, but as of Ab-

solute Necessity in it self, with respect to the † man-

ner of the Existence of each Part, no less

than with respect to the Self-Existence of the whole. Thus the Opinion of *Spinoza*, when expres-

sed

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sed plainly and consistently, comes evidently to this : That *the Material World*, and every Part of it, with the order and manner of Being of each Part, is the only Self-Existent, or Necessarily-Existing Being. And now Consequently, he must of Necessity affirm all the Conclusions, which I have before shown to follow demonstrably from that Opinion. He cannot possibly avoid affirming that 'tis a Contradiction, (not *to the Perfections of God* ; For that is mere senseless Cant and Amusement in Him who maintains that there is but One Substance in the Universe ; But he must affirm that it is *in it self and in Terms* a Contradiction,) for any thing to be , or to be imagined, in any respect otherwise than it Now is. He must say 'tis a Contradiction, to suppose the *Number, or Figure, or Order* of the Principal Parts of the World, could

possibly have been different from what they Now are. He must say Motion is necessary *of it self*; and consequently that 'tis a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any Matter to be at Rest: Or else He must affirm, (which is rather the more absurd of the two; as may appear from what has been already said in proof of the *Second* General Head of ~~this~~ ~~fore~~

~~going~~ Discourse; And yet he has * chosen to affirm it;) that Motion, as a Dependent Being, has been eternally communicated from one piece of Matter to another; without having

at all any Original Cause of its Being, either within it self or from without: Which, with other the like Consequences, touching the Necessity of the Existence of Things; the

* Corpus motum, vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterum ab alio, & sic in infinitum. *Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.*

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the very mention of which, is a sufficient Confutation of any Opinion they follow from; do, as I have said, unavoidably follow from the foremention'd Opinion of *Spinoza*: And consequently that Opinion, *viz.* *That the Universe or Whole World is the Self-existent or Necessarily-existing Being*, is demonstrated to be false.

I have in this Attempt to show, that *The Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent, and Self-existent*; designedly omitted the Argument usually drawn from the supposed absolute Impossibility in the Nature of the Thing it self, of the Worlds being Eternal, or having existed through an Infinite Succession of Time. And this I have done for the two following Reasons.

1st Because the Question between us and the Atheists, is not, ^{Of the Opinion concerning the Eternity of the} *whether* ^{World.}

whether the World can possibly have been Eternal ; but whether it can possibly be the Original, Independent, and Self-Existing Being : which is a very different Question: For many, who have affirmed the One, have still utterly denied the Other ; And almost all the Antient Philosophers that held the Eternity of the World, in whose Authority and Reasons our Modern Atheists do so mightily Boast and Triumph ; defended that their Opinion by such Arguments, as show plainly that they did by no means thereby intend to assert, that the material World was the Original, Independent, Self-Existing Being, in Opposition to the Belief of the Existence of a Supreme All-governing Mind, which is the Notion of God. So that the Deniers of the Being of God, have no manner of Advantage from that Opinion of the
Eternity

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Eternity of the World, even sup-
posing it could not be disproved.
Almost all the old Philosophers,
I say, who held the Eternity of
the World, did not thereby mean
(at least their Arguments do not
tend to prove) that it was Inde-
pendent and Self-Existent ; but
their Arguments are wholly le-
velled , either to prove barely
that Something must needs be
Eternal, and that the Universe
could not possibly arise out
of Nothing absolutely and with-
out Cause ; which is all that
Ocellus Lucanus's Arguments a-
mount to : Or else that the
World is an Eternal and Necessa-
ry Effect, flowing from the Essen-
tial and Immutable Energy of the
Divine Nature ; which seems to
have been *Aristotle's* Opinion : Or
else that the World is an Eter-
nal Voluntary Emanation from
the All-Wise and Supreme Cause ;
which

which was the Opinion of many of *Plato's Followers*. None of which Opinions or Arguments, will in the least help out our modern Atheists ; who would exclude Supreme *Mind* and Intelligence out of the Universe. For however the Opinion of the Eternity of the World, is really inconsistent with the Belief of its being Created in time : yet so long as the Defenders of that Opinion, either did not think it Inconsistent with the Belief of the World's being the Effect and Work of an *Eternal*, All-Wise and All-Powerful Mind ; or at least could defend that Opinion by such Arguments only, as did not in the least prove the Self-Existence or Independency of the World, but most of them rather quite the contrary ; 'Tis with the greatest Injustice and Unreasonableness in the World, that our Modern Atheists

(to

Being and Attributes of God. 61

(to whose Purpose the Eternity or Non-Eternity of the World would signifie nothing, unless at the same Time the Existence and Sovereignty of Eternal Intelligence or Mind were likewise disproved,) pretend either the Authority or the Reasons of these Men to be on their side.

Ocellus Lucanus, one of the ancientest Asserters of the Eternity of the World; whose Antiquity and Authority * Mr.

Blount opposes to that of *Moses*; in delivering his Opinion, speaks indeed like one that believed the Material World to be Self-existent; asserting, † that it is utterly incapable either

* Oracles of Reason; Letter to Mr. Gildon, p. 216.

† Ἀχύνητον τὸ πᾶν καὶ ἀνώλεθρον.

Ἀναρχον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον.

Κόσμον αὐτὸς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ

αἰδώς δεῖ καὶ αὐτοπλῆς καὶ διαμείνων τὰ πάντα αἰῶνα.

Ἀνὴρ οὐτὸς τῶ κόσμου, ἀναρχαῖον καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶ συνπαίχουσι. Λέγουσι μέρη, ὕδαρ, γῆν, &c. *Ocellus Lucan.* Περὶ δὲ τῶ παντὸς φύσεως.

of

of Generation or Corruption, of Beginning or End; that it is of it self Eternal and Perfect and Permanent for ever; and that the Frame and Parts of the World must needs be Eternal, as well as the Substance and Matter of the Whole: But when he comes to produce his Arguments or Reasons for his Opinion; they are either so very absurd and ridiculous, that even any Atheist in this Age ought to be ashamed to repeat them; as when he proves * that the World

* Τὸ ἀναρχὸν καὶ ἀτελεύτη-
τον ὅτι σφαιρικόν καὶ ὁμογενές,
πρὸς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ὁ κόσ-
μος καὶ ἀφθαρτός. ἥ τε γὰρ τῆ
σφαιρικῆς ἰσότητος, καὶ τῆς
ὁμογενείας ἰσότητος, ἀποδεικνύει
τὸ ἀναρχὸν καὶ ἀτελεύτη-
τον. ἥ τε ὁμογενείας &c. I-
bid.

Thus Translated: Nay that the Figure, Motion, &c. thereof, are without Beginning and End; thereby it plainly appears, that the World admitteth neither Production nor Dissolution: For the Figure is Spherical, and consequently on every side equal, and therefore without Beginning or Ending. Also the motion is circular, &c. *Oracles of Reason* p. 215.

Circle

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Circle, which has neither Beginning nor End : Or else they are such Arguments as prove only what no Man ever really denied ; viz. That Something must be Eternal, because 'tis impossible for Every Thing to arise out of Nothing, or to fall into Nothing ; As when he says † that the World

must have been Eternal, because 'tis a Contradiction for the Universe to have had a Beginning ;

since if it had a Beginning, it must have been caused by Something, and then it is not the Universe. To which One Argument, all that he says in his whole Book, is plainly reducible. So that 'tis evident, all that he really proves, is only this ; that there must needs be an Eternal Being in the Universe : and not, that Matter is Self-existent, in Opposition to

Intel-

† Ἀφύνητον τὸ πᾶν —
 ὅτι ἂν γέγονεν, ἐκ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν
 οὐκ ἔστιν παλαιός, ὅτι — Τὸ γὰρ
 ὃ πᾶν γινώσκον, οὐκ ἔστιν γί-
 νησι. καὶ τὸ πᾶν ὃ αἰδιώτατον —
 ἔκτος γὰρ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἐστίν.
 Ocell. ibid.

Intelligence and Mind. For, all that he asserts about the absolute Necessity of the Order and Parts of the World, is confessedly most ridiculous, not at all proved by the Arguments he alleges : And in some Passages of this very Book, as well as in other Fragments, He himself supposes, and is forced expressly to confess, that, however Eternal and Necessary every thing in the World be imagined to be ; yet even That Necessity must flow

from an * *Eternal and Intelligent Mind*, the Necessary Perfections of whose Nature are the Cause † of the *Harmony and Beauty of the World*, and particularly of Mens having || *Faculties, Organs of Sense, Appetites, &c.* fitted even to *Final Causes.*

* Τὸ ἀεικίνητον, δειὸν μὲν,
καὶ λόγον ἔχον καὶ ἔμφορον. Gcell.
Luc. de Leg. fragm.

† Συνέχει ὁ κόσμον ἀρμονία, ταύτης δ' αἰτία ὁ Θεός. Ibid.

|| Τὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ τὰ ὄργανα, καὶ τὰς ὁρέξεις ὑπὸ Θεῷ διδωδὲς ἀνθρώποις, ἵνα ἡδονῆς ἐνεκα δεδωδαι συμβέσκηεν, ἀλλὰ, &c. Idem Περὶ τοῦ πάντες φύσιν.

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Aristotle likewise, was a great
 Asserter indeed of the Eter-
 nity of the World: But not
 in Opposition to the Belief of
 the Being, or of the Power,
 Wisdom, or Goodness of God:
 On the contrary He for no other
 Reason asserted the World to be
 Eternal, but because he fancied
 that such an Effect must needs e-
 ternally proceed from such an e-
 ternal Cause. And so far was he
 from teaching, that Matter is the
 First and Original Cause of all
 Things; that on the contrary he e-
 very where expressly describes God
 to be an * Intelligent Being; † In- * N^o.
 corporeal; || The First Mover of all † Θεόν
 Things, Himself Immoveable; and ἀσώματον
 affirms, that * if there were nothing ἀκίνητον.
 but Matter in the World, there would Diog. in vi-
 be no Original Cause, but an Infinite τα Aristot.
 † τὸ πρῶτον
 κίνητον,
 ἀκίνητον.
 Aristot.
 Metaph.

* Εἰ μὴ ἔσαι παρὰ τὰ αἰδιτὰ ἄλλα, ἔκ ἔσαι ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος, 'ὅθεν
 αἰεὶ τ' ἀρχῆς ἀρχή. Ibid.

F

Pro-

Ari-

*A Demonstration of the
Progression of Causes ; which is ab-
furd.*

As to those Philosophers, who taught plainly and expressly, that Matter was not only Eternal, but also Self-existent and entirely Independent, Co-existing from Eternity with God, independently as a Second Principle : I have already shown the Impossibility of this Opinion, at the Entrance upon the present Head of Discourse, where I proved that Matter could not possibly be *Self-existent* : And I shall further demonstrate it to be False, when I come to prove the *Unity* of the Self-existent Being.

Plato, whatever his Opinion was about the Original Matter, very largely and fully declares his Sentiments about the Formation of the World, *viz.* that it was composed and framed by an Intelligent and

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and Wise God ; and there is no One of all the Antient Philosophers , who in all his Writings speaks so excellently and worthily * as He, concerning the Nature and Attributes of God. Yet as to the Time of the World's Beginning to be Formed, He seems to make it indefinite, when he says, † *The World must needs be an Eternal Resemblance of the Eternal Idea.* At least his Followers afterward so understood and explained it, as if by the Creation of the World, was not to be understood a Creation

* ὁ παντὶς καὶ πατὴρ τῶν πάντων.

ὁ γὰρ, ἑαυτὸν καὶ Θεὸς, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἀπαντα ἐργασάμεθα. De Republ. Lib. 10.

† Πᾶσα ἀνάγκη τίς τε κόσμον, οὕτως πρὸς ἑῷ. Plato in *Timaeo*. Which Words being very imperfect in our Copies of the Original, are thus rendered by Cicero. Si ergo generatus [est mundus ;] ad id effectus est, quod ratione sapientiaq; comprehenditur, atq; immutabili aeternitate continetur. Ex quo efficitur, ut sit necesse hunc, quem cernimus, mundum, simulacrum aeternum esse aliqujus aeterni. Cic. de Univerf.

* Qui autem a Deo quidem factum fatentur, non tamen eum volunt *Temporis* habere, sed suæ *Creationis* initium; ut modo quodam vix intelligibili, Semper sit factus. *Augustin. de Civit. Dei. Lib. 11. Cap. 4.*

De Mundo, & de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos scribit Plato, apertissime dicit eos esse cæpisse, & habere initium.-----Verum id quomodo intelligant, invenerunt [Platonici;] non esse hoc videlicet *Temporis*, sed *Substitutionis* initium. *Ibid. Lib. 10. Cap. 31.*

Sed mundum quidem fuisse semper, Philosophia auctor est; conditore quidem Deo, sed non ex tempore. *Macrob. in Somn. Scip. Lib. 2. Cap. 10.*

† Καὶ εἰ βέλῃ, παραδείγμα πρὸς πάντας τῶν γινωσκόντων, ἔνα γινώσκοντος τὸ ζήτημα. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σώματος τῆς ἐκείνης οὐκ αἵματος γινέται ὁμοῦλον. ὃ πρὸς τὸ σώμα πῃ ἢ οὐκ αἵματος. καὶ ἔχῃ ὁμοῦλον. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ δὲ ὁ κόσμος παρακαλέσθαι δὲ τὸ θεῶν αἵματος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἵματος, καὶ ζωοποιός δὲ πρὸς θεῶν ἕκαστος δὲ καὶ ὁμοῦλον. *Zacharia Scholast. Disputat.*

Sicut enim, inquiunt [Platonici,] si Pes ex æternitate semper fuisset in pulvere, semper ei subesset vestigium; quod tamen vestigium a calcante factum nemo dubitaret; nec alterum altero prius esset, quamvis alterum ab altero factum esset: Sic, inquiunt, & mundus atq; in illo Dii creati, & semper fuerunt; semper existente qui fecit; & tamen facti sunt. *Augustin. de Civitate Dei. Lib. 10. Cap. 31.*

in Time; * but only in Order of Nature, Causality and Dependence: That is; that the Will of God, and his Power of Acting, being necessarily as Eternal as his Essence; † the Effects of that Will and Power might

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be supposed coæval to the Will and Power themselves; in the same manner, as *Light* would eternally proceed from the *Sun*, or a *Shadow* from the *interposed Body*, or an *Impression* from an *imposed Seal*, if the respective Causes of these Effects were supposed Eternal.

From all which, it plainly appears how little Reason our Modern Atheists have to boast either of the Authority or Reasons of those Antient Philosophers, who held the Eternity of the World. For since these Men neither proved, nor attempted to prove, that the Material World was Original to it self, Independent, or Self-existing; but only that it was an Eternal Effect of an Eternal Cause, which is God; 'tis evident that this their Opinion, even supposing it could by no means be refu-

A Demonstration of the

ted, could afford no manner of Advantage to the Cause of those Atheists in our days, who excluding Supreme Mind and Intelligence out of the Universe, would fain make mere Matter and Necessity the Original and Eternal Cause of all Things.

2dly. The other Reason, why in this Attempt to Prove that *the Material World cannot possibly be the First and Original Being, Uncreated, Independent and Self-Existent*; I have omitted the Argument usually drawn from the supposed absolute Impossibility of the Worlds being Eternal, or having Existed through an Infinite Succession of Time; is because that Argument, however true it may be in it self, can never be so stated, as to be of any use in Convincing or Affecting the Mind of an Atheist, who must not be supposed to come prepared beforehand

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forehand with any transcendent Idea of the Eternity of God. For Since an Atheist cannot be supposed to Believe the Nice and Subtle Distinctions of the Schools; 'tis impossible by this Argument so to disprove the Possibility of the Eternity of the World, but that an Atheist will understand it to prove equally against the Possibility of any thing's being Eternal, and consequently that it proves nothing at all, but is only a Difficulty arising from our not being able to comprehend adequately the Notion of Eternity. That the Material World is not Self-Existent or Necessarily-Existing, but the Product of an Intelligent and Wise Agent, may (as I have already shown) be strictly demonstrated by bare Reason against the most Obstinate Atheist in the World: But the *Time When* the

World was Created ; or whether its Creation was, *properly speaking, in Time* ; is not so easy to demonstrate strictly by bare Reason, (as appears from the Opinions of many of the Antient Philosophers concerning that matter,) but the Proof of it ought to be taken from Revelation. To endeavour to prove, that there cannot possibly be any such thing as *infinite Time or Space*, from the Impossibility of an * Addition of Finite Parts ever composing or exhausting an Infinite : or from the imaginary *inequality of the Number* of Years, Days, and Hours that would be contained in the one ; or of the Miles, Yards, and Feet, that would be contained in the other ; is supposing Infinites to be made up of *Numbers* of Finites ; that is, 'tis supposing Finite Quantities to be *Aliquot* or

Con-

* Cudworth
System. p.
643.

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Constituent Parts of Infinite ; when indeed they are not so, but do all *Equally*, whether *Great* or *Small*, whether *Many* or *Few*, bear the very same proportion to an Infinite, as Mathematical Points do to a Line, or Lines to a Superficies, or as Moments do to Time; that is, None at all. So that to argue absolutely against the Possibility of Infinite Space or Time, merely from the imaginary inequality of the *Numbers* of their Finite Parts; which are not properly Constituent Parts, but mere Nothings in Proportion; is the very same thing as it would be to argue against the Possibility of the Existence of any determinate Finite Quantity, from the imaginary Equality or Inequality of the *Number* of the Mathematical Lines and Points contained therein; when indeed neither the one nor the other has (in propriety

propriety of Speech) any Number at all, but they are absolutely without Number : Neither can any Number or Quantity be any Aliquot or Constituent Part of Infinite, or be compared at all with it, or bear any kind of Proportion to it, or be the Foundation of any Argument in any Question concerning it.

*The Es-
sence of
the Self-
existent
Being In-
compre-
hensible.*

IV. *What the Substance or Es-
sence of that Being, which is Self-
Existent, or Necessarily-Existing, is ;*
we have no Idea, neither is it pos-
sible for us in any measure to com-
prehend it. That there is such a
Being, actually Existing without
us, we are sure (as I have already
shown) by strict and undeniable
Demonstration. Also what it is
not ; that is, that the Material
World is not it, as our Modern
Atheists

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Atheists would have it ; has been already Demonstrated. But what it is, I mean as to its Substance and Essence ; this we are infinitely unable to comprehend. Yet does not this in the least Diminish the Certainty of the Demonstration of its Existence. For it is one Thing, to know certainly that a Being Exists ; and another, to know what the Essence of that Being is : And the one may be capable of the strictest Demonstration, when the other is absolutely beyond the Reach of all our Faculties to understand. A Blind or Deaf Man has infinitely more Reason to deny the Being, or the Possibility of the Being, of Light or Sounds ; than any Atheist can have to deny, or doubt of, the Existence of God. For the one can at the utmost have no other Proof, but credible Testimony

mony, of the Existence of certain Things, whereof it is absolutely impossible that he himself should frame any manner of Idea, not only of their Essence, but even of their Effects or Properties ; But the Other may with the least use of his Reason be assured of the Existence of a Supreme Being by undeniable Demonstration, and may also certainly know abundance of its Attributes, (as shall be made appear in the following Propositions,) though its Essence be intirely incomprehensible. Wherefore nothing can be more Unreasonable and Weak, than for an Atheist upon this account to deny the Being of God, merely because his weak and finite Understanding cannot Frame to it self any Notion of the Substance or Essence of that First and Supreme Cause. We are utterly ignorant of

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of the Substance or Essence of all other things ; even of those things which we converse most familiarly with, and think we understand best. There is not so contemptible a Plant or Animal, that does not confound the most enlarged Understanding upon Earth : Nay even the simplest and plainest of all inanimate Beings, have their Essence or Substance hidden from Us in the deepest and most impenetrable Obscurity. How weak then and foolish is it to raise Objections against the Being of God, from the Incomprehensibleness of his Essence ! and to represent it as a strange and incredible thing, that there should Exist any Incorporeal Substance, the Essence of which we are not able to Comprehend ! As if it were not far more strange, that there should exist numberless Objects of our Senses, Things sub-

A Demonstration of the

subject to our daily Inquiry, Search and Examination ; and yet we not be able, no not in any measure, to find out the real Essence of any one even of the least of *these Things*.

From what has been said upon this Head, we may observe,

Of Infinite Space.

1st *The Weakness of Such, as have presumed to imagin Infinite Space to be a just Representation or adequate Idea of the Essence of the Supreme Cause.* This is a weak and fond Imagination, arising from hence, that Men using themselves to Judge of all Things by their Senses only, fancy Spiritual or Immaterial Substances, because they are not Objects of their Corporeal Senses, to be mere Nothings ; Just as Children imagin Air, because they cannot see it, to be mere Emptiness and Nothing. But the Fallacy is too gross, to deserve being

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being Insisted upon. There are Numberless Substances in the World, whose Essences are as intirely unknown and impossible to be represented to our Imaginations, as Colours are to a Man that was Born Blind, or Sounds to One that has been always Deaf: Nay, there is no Substance in the World, of which we know any thing further, than only a certain Number of its Properties or Attributes; of which we know fewer in some things, and in Others more. Infinite Space, is nothing else but an abstract Idea of Immensity or Infinity; even as Infinite Duration, is of Eternity: And it would be not much less proper, to say that Eternity is the Essence of the Supreme Cause; than to say, that Immensity is so. Indeed they seem Both to be but Attributes of an Essence Incomprehensible to Us; and

and when we endeavour to represent the real Substance of any Being whatsoever in our weak imaginations, we shall find our selves in like manner deceived.

The Vanity of the Schoolmen.

2dly. From hence appears the *Vanity of the Schoolmen*, who as in other Matters, so in their Disputes about the Self-Existent Being; when they come at what they are by no means able to comprehend or explain, least they should seem ignorant of any thing, they give us Terms of Art, and Words of Amusement; which under pretence of explaining the matter before them, seem really to have no manner of Idea or Signification at all. Thus, when they tell us concerning the Essence of God, that He is *Purus Actus*, *mera forma*, and the like; either the Words have no Meaning, and signifie nothing; or else they

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they express only the Perfection of his *Power*, and other Attributes; which is not what these Men intend to express by them.

V. *Though the Substance or Essence of the Self-Existent Being, is it self absolutely Incomprehensible to us: yet many of the Essential Attributes of his Nature are strictly Demonstrable, as well as his Existence. Thus in the first place the Self-Existent Being must of necessity be Eternal. The Idea's of Eternity and Self-Existence are so closely connected, that because Something must of Necessity be Eternal Independently and without any outward Cause of its Being, therefore it must necessarily be Self-existent; and because it is impossible but Something must be Self-existent, therefore it is necessary that it must likewise be*

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A Demonstration of the

Eternal. To be Self-existent is (as has been already shown) to Exist by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self. Now this Necessity being Absolute, and not depending upon any thing External, must be always unalterably the same; Nothing being alterable, but what is capable of being affected by Something without it self. That Being therefore, which has no other Cause of its Existence, but the absolute Necessity of its own Nature; must of Necessity have existed from everlasting, without Beginning; and must of Necessity exist to everlasting, without End.

*Of the
Manner
of our
Concei-
ving the
Eternity
of God.*

As to the *Manner* of this Eternal Existence, 'tis manifest it herein infinitely transcends the Manner of the Existence of all Created Beings; even of such as shall exist for ever; that whereas it is not possible for their finite Minds to comprehend

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comprehend all that is past, or to understand perfectly all things that are at present, much less to know all that is future, or to have entirely in their Power any thing that is to come ; but their Thoughts, and Knowledge and Power, must of Necessity have degrees and periods, and be successive and transient as the Things Themselves : The Eternal, Supreme Cause, on the contrary, (supposing him to be an *Intelligent Being*, which will hereafter be proved in the Sequel of this Discourse,) must of Necessity have such a perfect, independent and unchangeable Comprehension of all things, that there can be no One Point or Instant of his Eternal Duration, wherein all Things that are past, present, or to come, will not be as entirely known and represented to him in one single
G 2 Thought

Thought or View ; and all Things present and future, be equally intirely in his Power and Direction ; as if there was really no Succession at all, but all Things were actually present at once. Thus far we can speak Intelligibly concerning the Eternal Duration of the Self-Existent Being ; and no *Atheist* can say that this is an Impossible, Absurd or Insufficient Account : It is, in the most proper and intelligible Sense of the Words, to all the purposes of Excellency and Perfection, *Interminabilis vitæ tota simul & perfecta Possessio* : The entire and perfect Possession of an endless Life.

With respect to Succession.

Others have supposed that the Difference between the Manner of the Eternal Existence of the Supreme Cause, and that of the Existence of Created Beings, is this : That whereas the latter is a continual transient Succession of Duration ;

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tion; the former is one Point or Instant comprehending Eternity, and wherein all things are really co-existent. But this Distinction I shall not now insist upon; as being of no use in the present Dispute; because, supposing it never so true, yet it would be hard to prove and explain it in such a manner, as ever to convince an Atheist that there is any thing in it: And besides; as on the one hand the Schoolmen have indeed generally chosen to defend it; so on the other hand, there * are many Learned Men of not less Understanding and Judgment than they;

* *Crucem ingenio fingere, ut rem capiat fugientem Captam.*—

Tam fieri non potest, ut instans [Temporis] coexistat rei successiva, quam impossibile est punctum coexistere [coextendi] lineæ.—

Lusus merus non intellectuum verborum. Gassend. Physic. lib. 1.

I shall not trouble you with the inconsistent and unintelligible Notions of the Schoolmen; that it [*the Eternity of God*] is *duratio tota simul*, in which we are not to conceive any Succession, but to imagine it in an Instant. We may as well conceive the

Immensity of God to be a Point, as his Eternity to be an Instant. —

who have rejected and opposed it.

And how that can be

together, which must necessarily be imagined to be co-existent to Successions; let them that can, Conceive. *Archbishop Tillotson, Vol. 7. Sermon. 13.*

Others say, God sees and knows future things, by the presentiality and co-existence of all things in Eternity; for they say that future things are actually present and existing to God, tho' not in *mensura propria*, yet in *mensura aliena*. The School-Men have much more of this Jargon and canting Language; and I envy no Man the understanding these Phrases; but to me they seem to signify nothing, but to have been Words invented by idle and conceited Men; which a great many ever since, lest they should seem to be ignorant, would seem to understand: But I wonder most, that Men, when they have amused and puzzled themselves and others with hard Words, should call this *Explaining Things*. *Archbishop Tillotson, Vol. 6. Sermon. 6.*

That the
Self-Ex-
istent Be-
ing must
be Inf-
nite and
Omnipre-
sent.

VI. The Self-Existent Being, must of Necessity be Infinite and Omnipresent. The Idea of Infinity, as well as of Eternity, is so closely connected with that of Self-Existence, that because it is impossible but Something must be Infinite independently

Being and Attributes of God. 87

dently and of it self, (for else it would be impossible there should be any Infinite at all, unless an Effect could be perfecter than its Cause;) therefore it must of Necessity be Self-existent; and because Something must of Necessity be Self-Existent, therefore it is necessary that it must likewise be Infinite. To be Self-Existent (as has been already shown,) is to Exist by an Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing it self: Now this Necessity being Absolute in it self, and not depending on any Outward Cause; 'tis evident it must be *every where*, as well as *always*, unalterably the same: For a Necessity which is not every where the same, is plainly a Consequential Necessity only, depending upon some External Cause, and not an Absolute one in its own Nature: For a Necessity absolute-

ly such in it self, has no Relation to Time or Place, or any thing else : Whatever therefore Exists by an Absolute Necessity in its own Nature, must needs be Infinite as well as Eternal. To suppose a Finite Being, Self-Existent; is to say that it is a Contradiction for that Being not to Exist, the Absence of which may yet be conceived without a Contradiction : which is the greatest Absurdity in the World : For if a Being can without a Contradiction be absent from One Place, it may without a Contradiction be absent likewise from another Place, and from all Places : And whatever Necessity it may have of Existing, must arise from some External Cause, and not absolutely from it self ; and consequently the Being, cannot be Self-Existent.

From

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From hence it follows,

1st. That the Infinity of the Self-Existent Being, must be an Infinity of *Fulness* as well as of *Immensity*; that is, it must not only be without *Limits*, but also without *Diversity*, *Defect*, or *Interruption*. For Instance: Could matter be supposed *Boundless*, it would not therefore follow that it was in this compleat Sense *Infinite*; because though it had no *Limits*, yet it might have within it self any assignable *Vacuities*. But now whatever is Self-Existent, must of Necessity Exist absolutely in every Place alike, and be equally present every where; and consequently must have a true and absolute Infinity, both of *Immensity* and *Fulness*.

2^{dly}. From hence it follows, that the Self-Existent Being, must be a most Simple, Unchangeable,
In-

A Demonstration of the

Incorruptible Being, without Parts, Figure, Motion, Divisibility, or any other such Properties as we find in Matter. For all these things do plainly and necessarily imply Finiteness in their very Notion, and are utterly inconsistent with complete Infinity. Divisibility is a separation of Parts, real or mental; (meaning by mental Separation, not barely a partial Apprehending, but a removing, disjoining, or separating Parts one from another in the Imagination;) and any such Separation or Removing of Parts, is really or mentally a setting Bounds; either of which, destroys Infinity. Motion for the same reason implies Finiteness: And to have Parts, properly speaking, signifies either Difference and Diversity of Existence; which is inconsistent with Necessity; or else it signifies
Divi-

Being and Attributes of God. 91

Divisibility, real or mental as before, which is inconsistent with complete Infinity. *Corruption, Change, or any Alteration whatsoever,* implies Motion, Separation of Parts, and Finiteness: And any manner of *Composition*, in opposition to the most perfect *Simplicity*, signifies Difference and Diversity in the manner of Existence; which is inconsistent with Necessity.

'Tis evident therefore, that the Self-Existent Being must be Infinite in the *strictest* and most complete Sense. But now as to the particular *Manner* of his being Infinite or every where present, in opposition to the manner of Created Things being present in such or such finite places: It is as impossible for our finite Understandings, to comprehend or explain; as it is for us to form an adæquate Idea of Infinity: Yet that the thing is true,

*Of the
Manner
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ving the
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sity of God,*

true, that he is actually Omnipresent, we are as certain as we are that there must Something be Infinite; which no Man who has thought upon these things at all, ever denied. The Schoolmen indeed have presumed to assert, that the Immensity of God is a Point, as his Eternity is an Instant. But this being altogether Unintelligible; That which we can more safely affirm, and which no Atheist can say is absurd, and which nevertheless is sufficient to all wise and good Purposes, is this: That whereas all Finite and Created Beings, can be present but in One definite Place at Once; and Corporeal Beings even in that One place very imperfectly and unequally, to any Purpose of Power or Activity, only by the Successive Motion of different Members and Organs: The Supreme Cause on the

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the contrary, being an Infinite and most Simple Essence, and comprehending all things perfectly in himself, is *at all times equally* present, both in his Simple Essence, and by the Immediate and Perfect Exercise of all his Attributes, *to every Point* of the Boundless Immenfity, as if it were really all but one Single Point.

VII. *The Self-Existent Being, That the must of Necessity be but One.* This *Self-Existent Being* evidently follows from his being *can be* *Necessarily-Existent.* For Necessity *but One.* Absolute in it self, is Simple and Uniform, without any possible Difference or Variety: And all Variety or Difference of Existence, must needs arise from some External Cause, and be *dependent* upon it. For to suppose *two* (or more) *different* Natures existing of *themselves*

selves, necessarily, and *independent* from each other; implies this plain *Contradiction*; that each of them being independent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone, so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist, and consequently neither of them will be *Necessarily-Existing*. Whatsoever therefore exists necessarily, is the *One Simple Essence of the Self-Existent Being*: and whatsoever differs from that, is not *Necessarily-Existing*: Because in absolute *Necessity* there can be no *Difference* or *Diversity* of *Existence*. Other Beings there may be innumerable, besides the *One Infinite Self-Existent*: But no Other Nature can be *Self-Existent*, because so it would be individually the same, at the same time that it is supposed to be different.

From

Being and Attributes of God. 95

From hence it follows,

1st. That the *Unity* of God, is *Of the*
an *Unity of Nature or Essence* : *Trinity.*

For of *This* it is that we must be understood, if we would argue Intelligibly, when we speak of Necessity or Self-Existence. As to the *Diversity of Persons* in that One and the same Nature : That is ; whether in the Unity of the Divine Nature, there may not co-exist with the First Supreme Cause, such Emanations from it, as may themselves be equally Eternal, Infinite, and Perfect, by an absolute and complete Communication of all the Divine Attributes in an infinite and perfect degree, excepting only that of Self-Origination : Of this, I say ; as there is nothing in bare Reason, by which it can be demonstrated that there is actually any such thing ; so neither is there any
Argument,

Argument, by which it can be proved impossible or unreasonable to be supposed; and therefore when declared and made known to us by clear Revelation, it ought to be believed.

The Impossibility of two Independent Principles.

2dly. From hence it follows, That it is impossible there should be two different Self-existent Independent Principles, as some Philosophers have imagined; such as God and Matter. For since Self-Existence is Necessary Existence; and since it is an express Contradiction (as has already been shown) that two different Natures should each be Necessarily-existing; it evidently follows, that 'tis absolutely impossible there should be Two Independent Self-existent Principles, such as God and Matter.

The Error of Spinoza.

3dly. From hence we may observe the Vanity, Folly and Weakness of Spinoza: who because Self-existent

Being and Attributes of God. 97

stent Nature must necessarily be but One, concludes from thence, that the whole World, and every thing contained therein, is One Uniform Substance, Eternal, Uncreated and Necessary : Whereas just on the contrary he ought to have concluded, that because

all things in the World are very different one from another, and have all manner of Variety and all the Marks of Will and Arbitrariness and Changeableness, (and none of Necessity) in them, being plainly fitted with very different Powers to very different Ends, and distinguished one from another by a diversity; not only of Modes, but also of essential Attributes, and consequently (if we have any Knowledge at all of them)

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Una substantia non potest produci ab alia. *Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 6.*

Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet existere. *Prop. 7.*

Præter Deum nulla dari, neq; concipi potest substantia. *Prop. 14.*

them) of their Substances themselves also ; therefore none of these things are necessary or Self-existent, but must needs depend all upon some External Cause, that is, on the One Supreme, Unchangeable, Self-existent Being. That which led Spinoza into his foolish and destructive Opinion, and on which alone all his Argumentation is entirely built, is that absurd De-

finition of Substance ;

† Per substantiam Intelligo id, quod in se est, & per se concipitur ; hoc est, id, cujus conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat. *Definitio 3. Which presently after he thus explains : Ad naturam substantiæ pertinet Existere, hoc est, ipsius essentia involvit necessario existentiam. Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 7.*

† that it is Something, the Idea of which does not depend on, or presuppose, the Idea of any other thing, from which it might proceed ; but includes in it self Necessary-existence. Which Definition is either false and signifies nothing ; and then his

whole Doctrine built upon it, falls at once to the Ground : Or

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Being and Attributes of God. 99

if it be true ; then neither Matter, nor Spirit, nor any *Finite* Being whatsoever, (as has been before shown) is in that Sense properly a Substance, but (*the* ^{ο ων}) the Self-existent Being alone ; and so it will prove Nothing (notwithstanding all his *Show* and *Form* of Demonstration,) to his main Purpose ; which was, to make us believe that there is no such Thing as Power or Liberty in the Universe, but that * every particular thing in the World is by an Absolute Necessity just what it is, and could not possibly have been in any respect otherwise : Supposing, I say, his Definition of Substance to be true ; yet even *That* would really conclude nothing to his main Purpose concerning the Necessity of all Things : For since,

* Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio ordine, a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt.
Prop. 33.

according to that Definition, neither Matter nor Spirit nor any Finite Beings whatsoever, are Substances, but only Modes; how will it follow, that because Substance is Self-existent, therefore all these Modes are so too? Why,

† Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ infinita infinitis modis (hoc est, omnia quæ sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt,) sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

because † *from an Infinite Cause, Infinite Effects must needs follow.* Very true; supposing That Infinite Self-existent Cause, not to be a Voluntary, but

a mere Necessary Agent, that is, no Agent at all; Which Supposition (*in the present Argument*) is the Question begged; And what he afterwards attempts to allege in proof of it, shall afterwards be considered in its proper place.

VIII. *The Self-Existent and Ori-* That the
ginal Cause of all things, must be Self-ex-
an Intelligent Being. In this Pro- istent Be-
position lies the main Question be- ing must
tween us and the Atheists. For be Intelli-
that Something must be Self-Ex- gent.
istent; and that That which is
Self-Existent, must necessarily be
Eternal and Infinite and the Ori-
ginal Cause of all things; will
not bear much dispute. But all
Atheists, whether they hold the
World to be *of it self* Eternal both
as to the Matter and Form, or
whether they hold the Matter on-
ly to be Necessary and the Form
Contingent, or whatever Hypo-
thesis they frame; have always as-
serted and must maintain, either
directly or indirectly, that the
Self-Existent Being is not an In-
telligent Being, but either pure
unactive Matter, or (which in o-
ther

ther Words is the very same thing) a mere Necessary Agent. For a mere Necessary Agent must of necessity either be plainly and directly in the grossest Sense Unintelligent; which was the antient Atheists Notion of the Self-Existent Being: or else its Intelligence (which is the assertion of *Spinoza* and some Moderns,) must be wholly separate from any Power of Will and Choice; which in Respect of any Excellency and Perfection, or indeed to any common Sense at all, is the very same thing.

Now that the Self-Existent Being, is not such a Blind and Unintelligent Necessity, but in the most proper Sense an Understanding and really Active Being; cannot indeed be Demonstrated strictly and properly *a priori*; because we know not wherein Intelligence consists,

sists, nor can see the immediate and necessary Connection of it with Self-Existence, as we can that of Eternity, Infinity, Unity, &c. But *a posteriori*, almost every thing in the World Demonstrates to us this great Truth, and affords undeniable Arguments to prove that the World, and all things therein, are the Effects of an Intelligent and Knowing Cause.

And 1st, Since in general there are manifestly in Things, various kinds of Powers and very different Excellencies and Degrees of Perfection; it must needs be, that in the Order of Causes and Effects, the Cause must always be more Excellent than the Effect; and consequently the Self-Existent Being, whatever That be Supposed to be, must of necessity (being the Original of all things) contain in it self the Sum and highest Degree

Proved from the Degrees of Perfection in Things, and the Order of Causes and Effects.

of all the Perfections of all things. Not because that which is Self-Existent, must *therefore* have all possible Perfections : (For This, though most certainly true in it self, yet cannot be so clearly demonstrated *a priori* :) But because it is impossible that any effect should have any Perfection, which was not in the Cause : For if it had, then that Perfection would be caused by Nothing ; which is a flat Contradiction. Now an Unintelligent Being, 'tis evident, cannot be indued with all the Perfections of all things in the World. All things therefore cannot arise from an Unintelligent Original : and consequently the Self-Existent Being, must of Necessity be Intelligent.

There

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There is no Possibility for an Atheist to avoid the Force of this Argument any other way, than by asserting one of these two things : Either that there is no Intelligent Being at all in the Universe ; or that Intelligence is no distinct Perfection, but merely a Composition of Figure and Motion, as Colour and Sounds are supposed to be. Of the former of which, every Mans own Conscience is an abundant Confutation : And that the latter, (in which the main strength of Atheism lies,) is most absurd and impossible, shall be shown immediately : Which nevertheless if it could be supposed to be True, yet that even upon That Supposition it would still follow that the Self-Existing Being must needs be Intelligent ; shall be proved in my 4th Argument upon this present Head.

Head. In the mean time, that it is most absurd and impossible to suppose Intelligence not to be any distinct Perfection, properly speaking, but merely a Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; will appear from what shall be said in the ensuing Argument, which is

*From the
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is in crea-
ted Be-
ings.*

2ly. Since in *Man in particular* there is undeniably that Power, which we call Thought, Intelligence, Consciousness, Perception or Knowledge ; there must of Necessity either have been from Eternity *without any Original Cause at all*, an infinite Succession of Men, whereof *no one* has had a *Necessary*, but *every one* a *Dependent and Communicated Being* ; or else these Beings, indued with Perception and Consciousness, must at some time or other have arisen purely out of that which had

Being and Attributes of God. 107

had no such Quality as Sense, Perception or Consciousness ; or else they must have been produced by some *Intelligent* Superiour Being. There never was nor can be any Atheist whatsoever, that can deny but that One of these three Suppositions must be the Truth : If therefore the two former can be proved to be false and impossible, the latter must be owned to be Demonstrably true. Now that the first is impossible, is evident from what has been already said in proof of the *Second* General Head of this Discourse. And that the second is likewise impossible ; may be thus Demonstrated. If Perception or Intelligence, be a *distinct Quality* or Perfection ; and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion ; then Beings indued with Perception and Conscious-

sciousness, can never have arisen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness; because nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, that it hath not either actually in it self, or at least in a higher degree: *But* Perception or Intelligence, is a distinct Quality or Perfection; and not a meer Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion. *First, If Perception or Intelligence, be any real, distinct Quality or Perfection; and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion; then Beings indued with Perception or Consciousness, can never possibly have arisen purely out of that which it self had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness; because nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, that it hath not either actually in it self, or at least in a higher*

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higher degree. This is very evident; because if any thing could give another any Perfection which it has not it self, that Perfection would be caused absolutely by *Nothing*; which is a flat Contradiction. If any one here replies, (as Mr. Gildon has done * in a * *Oracles of Reason*, pag. 186. Letter to Mr. Blount,) that Colours, Sounds, Taste, and the like, arise from Figure and Motion, which have no such Qualities in themselves; or that Figure, Divisibility, and other Qualities of Matter are confessed to be given it by God, who yet cannot without extreme Blasphemy be said to have any such Qualities himself; and that therefore in like manner Perception or † Intelligence may arise out of that which has no Intelligence it self: The Answer is very easie:

† If with one of Cicero's Dialogists they would infer that the whole must have Understanding, because some Portions of it are first,

110 *A Demonstration of the*

Intelligent ; — we may retort with the other Speaker in *Cicero*, that by the same Argument, the Whole must be a Courtier, a Musician, a Dancing-Master, or a Philosopher, because many of the Parts are such. Mr. *Toland's Letter, Motion essential to Matter.*

first, That Colours, Sounds, Taste, and the like, are by no means Effects arising from mere Figure and Motion ; there being nothing in the Bodies themselves, the Objects of the Senses, that has any manner of Similitude to any of these Qualities ; but they are plainly *Thoughts* or Modifications of the Mind it self, which is an Intelligent Being ; and are not properly *Caused*, but only *Occasioned*, by the Impressions of Figure and Motion : Nor will it at all help an Atheist (as to the present Question,) though we make for, his sake (that we may allow him the greatest possible Advantage) even That most absurd Supposition, that the Mind it self is nothing but

Being and Attributes of God. III

but mere Matter, and not at all an Immaterial Substance; For even supposing it to be mere Matter, yet he must needs confess it to be such Matter, as is indued not only with bare Figure and Motion, but also with the Quality of Intelligence and Perception; and then, as to the present Question, it will still come to the same thing; that Colours, Sounds, and the like, which are not Qualities of Unintelligent Bodies, but Perceptions of Mind, can no more be caused by, or arise from, mere Unintelligent Figure and Motion, than Colour can be a Triangle, or Sound a Square, or Something be caused by Nothing. And then, as to the Second Part of the Objection; that Figure, Divisibility, and other Qualities of Matter are (as we our selves acknowledge) given it by God, who yet cannot with-

without extreme Blasphemy be said to have any such Qualities himself; and that therefore in like manner Perception or Intelligence may arise out of that which has no Intelligence it self; The Answer is still easier; That Figure, Divisibility, and other such like Qualities of Matter, are not real, proper, distinct and Positive Powers, but only Negative Qualities, Deficiencies or Imperfections; and tho' no Cause can communicate to its Effect any real Perfection which it has not it self, yet the Effect may easily have many Imperfections or Negative Qualities which are not in the Cause. Though therefore Figure, Divisibility and the like, (which are mere Negations, as all Limitations are,) may be in the Effect, and not in the Cause; yet Intelligence, (which we now suppose, and shall prove
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Being and Attributes of God. 113

immediately, to be a distinct Quality; and which no Man can say is a mere Negation;) cannot possibly be so. And now, having thus demonstrated, that if Perception or Intelligence be supposed to be a *distinct Quality* or Perfection, (though even but of *Matter* only, if the Atheist pleases,) and not a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion; then Beings indued with Perception or Consciousness, can never have risen purely out of that which had no such Quality as Perception or Consciousness; because nothing can ever give to another any Perfection, which it has not it self: It will easily appear, *secondly*, That Perception or Intelligence is really such a *distinct Quality* or Perfection; and not possibly a mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion; And
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that for this plain Reason ; because Intelligence *is not* Figure, and Consciousness *is not* Motion. For whatever can arise from, or be compounded of any Things ; is still only those very Things, of which it was compounded : And if infinite Compositions or Divisions be made eternally, the Things will still be but eternally the same : And all their possible Effects, can never be any thing but Repetitions of the same. For instance : All possible Changes, Compositions or Divisions of *Figure*, are still nothing but *Figure* : And all possible Compositions or Effects of *Motion*, can eternally be nothing but mere *Motion*. If therefore there ever was a Time, when there was nothing in the Universe but Matter and Motion ; there never could have been any thing else therein, but Matter and Motion : And it would have

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have been as impossible, there should ever have existed any such thing as Intelligence or Consciousness; or even any such thing as Light, or Heat, or Sound, or Colour, or any of those we call Secondary Qualities of Matter; as it is now impossible for Motion to be Blue or Red, or for a Triangle to be transformed into a Sound. That which has been apt to deceive Men in this matter, is this; that they imagine Compounds to be somewhat really different from that of which they are compounded; Which is a very great Mistake. For all the Things, of which Men so judge; either, if they be really different, are not Compounds nor Effects of what Men judge them to be, but are something totally distinct; as when the Vulgar thinks Colours and Sounds to be Properties Inhe-

rent in Bodies, when indeed they are purely Thoughts of the Mind: Or else, if they be really Compounds and Effects, then they are not different, but exactly the same that ever they were; as when two Triangles put together make a Square, that Square is still nothing but two Triangles; or when a Square cut in halves makes two Triangles, those two Triangles are still only the two halves of a Square; or when the mixture of Blew and Yellow Powder makes a Green, that Green is still nothing but Blew and Yellow intermixed, as is plainly visible by the help of Microscopes: And, in short, every thing by Composition, Division, or Motion; is nothing else but the very same it was before, taken either in whole or by Parts, or in different Place or Order. Mr. *Hobbs* seems to have been aware of

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of this : And therefore, though he is very sparing, and as it were ashamed to speak out ; yet finding himself pressed in his own Mind with the Difficulty arising from the Impossibility of Sense or Consciousness being merely the Effect of Figure and Motion ; and it not serving *his* Purpose at all, (were the thing never so possible,) to suppose that God by an immediate and voluntary Act of his *Almighty* Power indues certain Systems of Matter with Consciousness and Thought, (of which Opinion I shall have occasion to speak somewhat more hereafter ;)

he is forced * to recur to that prodigiously absurd Supposition, that All Matter, as Matter, is indued not only with Figure and a Capacity of Mo-

* Scio fuisse Philosophos quosdam, eosdemq; viros doctos, qui corpora omnia Sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt ; nec video, si natura sensationis in reactione sola collocaretur, quomodo refutaretur,

possint. Sed etsi ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum phantasma aliquod nasceretur, illud tamen remoto objecto statim cessaret: Nam nisi ad retinendum motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto, apta habeant Organa, ut habent Animalia; ita tantum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se recorderentur. Sensiōi ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur, necessario adhæret memoria aliqua, &c. *Hobbs Physic. Cap. 25. Sect. 5.*

tion, but also with an actual Sense or Perception; and wants only the Organs and Memory of Animals, to express its Sensation.

*From the
Beauty,
Order,
and final
Causes of
Things.*

3dly, That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all things, is an Intelligent Being; appears abundantly from the excellent Variety, Order, Beauty and Wonderful Contrivance and Fitness of all things in the World, to their proper and respective Ends. This Argument has been so Learnedly and Fully handled, both by Ancient and Modern Writers; that I do but just mention it, without enlarging at all

all upon it. I shall only at this Time make this One Observation: That whereas *Des Cartes* and others have indeavoured to give a Possible Account, how the World might be formed by the Necessary Laws of Motion alone; they have by so seemingly Vast an Undertaking, really meant no more, than to explain Philosophically how the inanimate part, that is, infinitely the least considerable part of the World, might possibly have been framed: For as to Plants and Animals, in which the Wisdom of the Creator principally appears; they have never in any tolerable manner, or with any the least appearance of Success, pretended to give an Account, how *They* were originally Formed. In these Things, Matter and the Laws of Motion, are able to do nothing at all: And how ridiculous the Epicurean Hy-

pothesis is, of the Earth producing them all at first by chance; (besides that I think it is now given up, even by all Atheists;) appears from the late Discovery made in Philosophy, that there is no such thing as equivocal Generation of any the meanest Animal or Plant; the Sun and Earth and Water, and all the Powers of Nature in Conjunction, being able to do nothing at all towards the producing any thing indued with so much as even a Vegetable Life: (From which most excellent Discovery, we may *by the* by observe the Usefulness of Natural and Experimental Philosophy, sometimes even in Matters of Religion.) Since therefore things are thus, it must unavoidably be granted (even by the most Obstinate Atheist,) either that all Plants and Animals are originally the Work of an
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Being and Attributes of God. 121

Intelligent Being, and Created by him in Time; or that having been from Eternity in the same Order and Method they now are in, they are an Eternal Effect of an Eternal Intelligent Cause continually exerting his Infinite Power and Wisdom; or else that without any Self-existent Original at all, they have been derived one from another in an Eternal Succession, by an infinite Progress of Dependent Causes: The first of these three ways, is the Conclusion we assert: The second, (so far as the Cause of Atheism is concerned,) comes to the very same thing: And the third I have already shown, (in the Proof of the Second General Head of this Discourse,) to be absolutely Impossible and a Contradiction.

4thly,

*From the
Original
of Moti-
on.*

4thly, Supposing it was possible that the Form of the World and all the Visible things contained therein, with the Order, Beauty, and exquisite Fitness of their Parts; nay, supposing that even Intelligence it self, with Consciousness and Thought, in all the Beings we know, could possibly be the Result or Effect of mere Unintelligent Matter, Figure and Motion: (which is the most unreasonable and impossible Supposition in the World:) Yet even still there would remain an undeniable Demonstration, that the Self-existent Being, (whatever it be supposed to be,) must be Intelligent. For even these Principles themselves [*Unintelligent Figure and Motion*] could never have possibly existed without there having been before them an Intelligent Cause. I instance in *Motion*.

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Being and Attributes of God. 123

'Tis evident there is Now such a thing as Motion in the World : Which either began at some Time or other, or was Eternal : If it began at any Time, then the Question is granted, that the First Cause is an Intelligent Being ; For mere Unintelligent Matter, and that at Rest, 'tis manifest could never of it self begin to Move : On the contrary, if Motion was Eternal, either it was eternally caused by some Eternal Intelligent Being ; or it must of it self be Necessary and Self-existent ; or else, without any Necessity in its own Nature, and without any External Necessary Cause, it must have existed from Eternity by an Endless Successive Communication : If Motion was eternally Caused by some Eternal Intelligent Being ; this also is granting the Question, as to the present Dispute : If it
was

was of it self Necessary and Self-existent; then it follows, that it must be a Contradiction in Terms, to suppose any Matter to be at Rest; And it must also imply a Contradiction, to suppose that there might *possibly* have been originally more or less Motion in the Universe than there *actually* was; which is so very absurd a Consequence, that *Spinoza* himself, though he expressly asserts all Things to be Necessary, yet

* *Spinozae Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 33. compared with Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.*

seems ashamed * to speak out his Opinion, or rather plainly contradicts himself in the Question about the Original of Motion: But if it be said that Motion, without any Necessity in its own Nature, and without any External Necessary Cause, has existed from Eternity, merely by an Endless Successive Communication;

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tion ; as † *Spinoza*,
inconsistently enough,
seems to assert ; This
I have before shown,
(in the Proof of the
Second General Pro-
position of this Dis-
course,) to be a flat
Contradiction. It re-
mains therefore, that
Motion must of Necessity be O-
riginally Caused by Something
that is Intelligent ; or else there
never could have been any such
Thing as Motion in the World :
And consequently the Self-ex-
istent Being, the Original Cause
of all Things , (whatever it
be supposed to be ,) must of
Necessity be *an Intelligent Be-
ing.*

From hence it follows again,
that the material World, cannot
possibly be the Original Self-Ex-
istent

† Corpus motum
vel quiescens, ad mo-
tum vel quietem de-
terminari debuit ab a-
lio corpore, quod e-
tiam ad motum vel
quietem determinatum
fuit ab alio, & illud
iterum ab alio, & sic
in infinitum. Ethic.
Par. II. Prop. 13. *Lem-
ma 3.*

istent Being. For since the Self-Existent Being, is demonstrated to be Intelligent; and the Material World plainly is not so; it follows that the Material World cannot possibly be Self-Existent. What some have fondly imagined concerning *a Soul of the World*; if thereby they mean a Created, Dependent Being; signifies nothing in the present Argument: But if they Understand thereby Something Necessary and Self-Existent; then it is nothing else, but a false, corrupt, and imperfect Notion of God.

That the Self-existent Being must be a Free Agent.

IX. *The Self-Existent and Original Cause of all Things, is not a necessary Agent, but a Being inclined with Liberty and Choice.* The contrary to this Proposition, is the Foundation and the Sum of what

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what *Spinoza* and his Followers have asserted, concerning the Nature of God. What Reasons or Arguments they have offered for their Opinion, I shall have occasion to consider briefly in my Proof of the Proposition it self. The Truth of which, appears

1st In that it is a Necessary *This a necessary Consequence* of the foregoing Proposition. For *Intelligence* without *Liberty* (as I there hinted) is *the foregoing Proposition.* really (in respect of any Power, Excellence, or Pefection,) *no Intelligence* at all. It is indeed a *Consciousness*, but it is merely a *Passive One*; a Consciousness, not of Acting, but purely of being Acted upon. Without Liberty, nothing can in any tolerable Propriety of Speech, be said to be an Agent or Cause of any thing. For to Act necessarily, is really and

and properly not to Act at all, but only to be Acted upon. What therefore *Spinoza* and his Followers assert concerning the Production of all Things *

* *Ex necessitate Divinae naturæ, infinita, infinitis modis sequi debent. Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 16.*

from the Necessity of the Divine Nature, is mere Cant and Words without any meanings at all. For if by the Necessity of the Divine Nature they understand not the Perfection and Rectitude of his Will, whereby God is unalterably determined to do always what is best in the whole; (as confessedly they do not; because this is consistent with the most perfect Liberty and Choice;) but on the contrary they mean an Absolute and Strictly Natural Necessity: It follows evidently, that when they say God, by the Necessity of his Nature, is the Cause and

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and Author of all things; they understand him to be a Cause or Agent in no other Sense, than as if a Man should say that a Stone, by the Necessity of its Nature, is the Cause of its own falling and striking the Ground; which is really not to be an Agent or Cause at all; but their Opinion amounts to this, that all things are equally Self-Existent, and consequently that the Material World is God; which I have before proved to be a Contradiction. In like manner, when they speak of the Intelligence and Knowledge of God; they mean to attribute these Powers to him in no other Sense, than the *Hylozoicks* attributed them to all Matter; that is, that a Stone, when it falls, has a Sensation and Consciousness; but That Consciousness is no Cause at all, or Power of Acting.

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Which

Which kind of Intelligence, in any tolerable Propriety of Speech, is no Intelligence at all : And Consequently the Arguments that proved the Supreme Cause to be *properly* an Intelligent and Active Being, do also undeniably prove that he is likewise indued with Liberty and Choice, which alone is the Power of Acting.

Proved further from the Arbitrary Disposition of Things in the World ; with an Answer to Spinoza's Arguments for the Necessity of all Things.

2^{ly}, If the Supreme Cause, is not a Being indued with Liberty and Choice, but a mere Necessary Agent, whose Actions are all as absolutely and naturally Necessary as his Existence : Then it will follow, that nothing which is not, could *possibly* have been ; and that nothing which is, could *possibly* not have been ; and that no Mode or Circumstance of the Existence of any thing, could *possibly* have been in any respect otherwise, than it now actually is.

All

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All
false
the
Cause
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Libe
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ficere
in ejus
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— E
Potent
necessi
eterno
duobus
Omni
non tan
existen
Demonst
Si re
ad open
ergo De
Prop. 3
Quic
fario est
Deum
ad Prop.
Res n
potueru

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All which, being evidently most ^{* Alii} false and absurd : it follows on ^{putant,} the contrary, that the Supreme ^{Deum} Cause is not a mere necessary A- ^{esse cau-} gent, but a Being indued with ^{fam li-} Liberty and Choice. ^{beram,} * The Con- ^{propter-} sequence ; that if the Supreme ^{ea quod} ^{potest,} ^{ut pu-} ^{tant, ef-}

ficere ut ea quæ ex ejus natura sequi diximus, hoc est, quæ in ejus potestate sunt, non fiant; sed hoc idem est ac si dicerent, quod Deus potest efficere, ut ex natura trianguli non sequatur, ejus tres angulos æquales esse duobus rectis. — Ego me satis clare ostendisse puto, a summa Dei Potentia Omnia necessario effluxisse, vel semper eadem necessitate sequi; eodem modo ac ex natura trianguli ab æterno & in æternum sequitur, ejus tres angulos æquari duobus rectis. *Ethic. Par. I. Schol. ad Prop. 17.*

Omnia ex necessitate naturæ divinæ determinata sunt, non tantum ad existendum, sed etiam ad certo modo existendum & operandum, nullumq; datur Contingens. *Demonstrat. Prop. 29.*

Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari; ut naturæ ordo alius esset: ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est. *Prop. 33. Demonstrat.*

Quicquid concipimus in Dei Potestate esse, id necessario est. *Prop. 35.*

Deum non operari ex libertate Voluntatis: *Corol. ad Prop. 32.*

Res nullo alio modo, neq; alio ordine a Deo produci potuerunt, quam productæ sunt. *Prop. 33.*

Cause be a Necessary Agent, then nothing which is not, could *possibly* have been; and nothing which is, could *possibly* either not have been, or have been different from what 'tis; is expressly owned by Spinoza to be the unavoidable Consequence of his own Opinion: And accordingly he endeavours to maintain, that *no Thing, or Mode of Existence of any Thing, could possibly have been in any respect different from what it now actually is*: His

Reasons are; (1.) because † *from an infinitely perfect Nature, infinite Things in infinite Manners, must needs proceed*; and (2.) * *because, if any thing could possibly be otherwise than it is, the Will and Nature of God must be supposed capable*

† Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi debent. *Prop. 16.*

* Si res alterius naturæ potuissent esse, vel alio modo ad operandum determinari; ut naturæ Ordo alius esset: Ergo Dei etiam natura alia posset esse quam jam est. *Prop. 33. Demonstrat.*

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capable of change ; and
(3.) † because, if all
possible Things in all
possible Manners do not
always and necessarily
exist, they never can All
exist ; but some Things,
that do not exist, will
still always be possible
only ; and so the Actual
Omnipotence of God is
taken away. The first
of these Arguments, is
a plain begging the
Question : For, that
an Infinitely Perfect
Nature, is able indeed
to produce Infinite
Things in Infinite
Manners, is certainly true ; but
that it *must* always *actually* do so,
by an *absolute Necessity of Nature*,
without any Power of Choice, ei-
ther as to Time or Manner or

† Imo adversarii, [qui
negant, ex necessitate
divinae naturae omnia
necessario fluere,] Dei
Omnipotentiam negare
videntur. Coguntur
enim fateri, Deum in-
finita creabilia intelli-
gere, quae tamen nun-
quam creare poterit.
Nam alias, si scilicet
omnia, quae intelligit,
crearet ; suam, juxta
ipsos, exhauriret Omni-
potentiam, & se im-
perfectum redderet. Ut
igitur Deum perfe-
ctum statuunt, eo redi-
guntur, ut simul statu-
ere debeant, ipsum non
posse omnia efficere,
ad quae ejus potentia
se extendit. Coroll. ad
Prop. 17.

Circumstances, does by no means follow from the Perfection of its Nature, unless it be first *supposed* to be a *Necessary Agent*; which is the very Question begged, that was to be proved. The *second* Argument, is (if possible) still weaker; For how does it follow, if God, according to his eternal unerring Purpose and Infinite Wisdom, produces different Things at different Times and in different Manners; that therefore the Will and Nature of God, is changeable? It might exactly as well be argued, that if God (according to *Spinoza's* Supposition) does *Always* necessarily produce all possible *Variety* of Things; therefore his Will and Nature is *Always* necessarily infinitely *various, unequal, and dissimilar to it self*. And as to the *third* Argument; (besides that 'tis a mere Metaphysical Vanity, and makes

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makes no difference between God's *actually and necessarily* doing always all possible Things in all possible Manners, and his being *able to do them*;) it is just such Reasoning, as if a Man should argue, that if all possible [Eternal] Duration be not Always actually exhausted, it never can be All Exhausted; and that therefore so the *Eternity* of God is taken away. But whatever the Arguments were, and if they were never so much more plausible than they really are; yet the Assertion it self, [*viz: That no Thing, or Mode of Existence of any Thing, could possibly have been made in any respect different from what it actually is,*] is so palpably absurd and false, so contradictory to experience and the Nature of Things, and to the most obvious and common Reason of Mankind; that of

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it self it immediately and upon the first hearing, sufficiently confutes any Principle of which it is a Consequence. For all Things in the World appear plainly to be the most Arbitrary that can be imagined ; and to be wholly the Effects, not of *Necessity*, but of Wisdom and Choice. A *Necessity* indeed of *Fitness* ; that is, that things could not have been Otherwise than they are, without diminishing the Beauty, Order, and well-Being of the Whole ; there may be, and (as far as we can apprehend) there certainly Is : But this is so far from serving our Adversaries Purpose, that on the contrary 'tis a direct Demonstration that all things were made and ordered by a Free and a Wise Agent. That therefore which I affirm, contradictory to *Spinoza's* Assertion, is, That there is not the

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the least appearance of an *Absolute Necessity of Nature*, (so as that any Variation would imply a Contradiction,) in any of these Things. *Motion* it self, and all its Quantities and Directions, with the Laws of *Gravitation*, are intirely Arbitrary ; and might possibly have been altogether different from what they now are. The *Number and Motion of the Heavenly Bodies*, have no manner of Necessity in the Nature of the Things themselves. The number of the Planets might have been greater or less ; And the Direction of all their Motions, both of the primary and secondary Planets, uniformly from West to East, when by the Motion of Comets it appears there was no Necessity but that they might as easily have moved in all imaginable transverse Directions ; is an evident proof that

that these things are the Effect of Wisdom and Choice. There is not the least appearance of Necessity, but that all these things might possibly have been infinitely varied from their present Constitution; and (as the late improvements in Astronomy discover) they *are* actually liable to very great Changes. Every thing upon *Earth*, is still more evidently arbitrary; and plainly the Product, not of Necessity, but Will. What absolute Necessity, for just such a Number of *Species* of *Animals* or *Plants*? or who without blushing dare affirm, that * neither the Form, nor Order, nor any the minutest Circumstance or Mode of Existence of any of these Things, could *possibly* have been in the least diversified by the Supreme Cause?

* Res
nullo a-
lio mo-
do, neq;
alio Or-
dine, a
Deo pro-
duci po-
tuerunt,
quam
productæ sunt.

Spinoza ut supra.

To

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To give but one Instance : In all the greater Species of Animals, Where was the Necessity for that conformity we observe in the Number and Likeness of all their Principal Members ? and how would it have been a Contradiction, to suppose any or all of them varied from what they now are ? To suppose indeed the continuance of such Monsters as *Lucretius* imagines to have perished for want of the principal Organs of Life, is really a Contradiction ; But how would it have been a Contradiction for a whole Species of *Horses* or *Oxen*, to have subsisted with *Six Legs* or *Four Eyes* ? But 'tis a shame to insist longer upon so plain an Argument.

It might have been Objected with much more Plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause cannot be

be Free, because He must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve *Spinoza's* Purpose. For this is a Necessity, not of Nature and Fate, but of Fitness and Wisdom; a Necessity, consistent with the greatest Freedom and most perfect Choice. For the only Foundation of this Necessity, is such an unalterable Rectitude of Will and Perfection of Wisdom, as makes it impossible for a Wise Being to resolve to Act Foolishly; or for a Nature infinitely Good, to Choose to do that which is Evil. *Of which I shall have Occasion to speak more hereafter, when I come to Deduce the Moral Attributes of God.*

The same 3ly, If there be any Final Cause
proved of any thing in the Universe;
also from then the Supreme Cause, is not
Final a Necessary, but a Free Agent.
Causes. This

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This Consequence also, *Spinoza* acknowledges to be unavoidable: And therefore he has no other way left, but with a strange

Confidence to † expose

all Final Causes, as the Fictions of ignorant and superstitious Men:

and to * laugh at those who are so foolish and childish as to fancy that

Eyes were designed and fitted to see with, Teeth

to chew with, Food to be eaten for Nourishment, the Sun to give

light, &c. I suppose it will not be thought, that when once a Man comes to this, he is to be disputed with any longer. Whoever

pleases, may, for satisfaction on this Head, consult *Galen de Usu Partium*, *Tully de natura Deorum*,

Mr. Boyle of Final Causes, and *Mr. Ray*

† Naturam finem nullum sibi præfixum habere; & omnes causas Finales, nihil, nisi humana esse Figmenta. *Appendix ad Prop. 36.*

* Oculos ad Videndum, dentes ad masticandum, herbas & animantia ad alimentum, solem ad illuminandum, mare ad alendum pisces, &c. *Ibid.*

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Ray of the Wisdom of God in the Creation. I shall only observe this One Thing, that the greater the Improvements and Discoveries are, which are daily made in Astronomy and Natural Philosophy; the more clearly is this Question continually determined, to the Shame and Confusion of Atheists.

*From the
finiteness
of Crea-
ted Be-
ings.*

4thly, If the Supreme Cause be a mere Necessary Agent, it is impossible any Effect or Product of that Cause should be *Finite*. For since that which Acts necessarily, cannot govern or direct its own Actions; but must necessarily produce whatever can be the Effect or Product of its Nature: 'Tis plain, every Effect of such an Infinite Uniform Nature, acting every where necessarily alike; must of Necessity be Immense, or Infinite in Extension: And so no
Crea-

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Creature in the Universe, could possibly be Finite; which is infinitely Absurd and contrary to Experience. *Spinoza*, to shuffle off this Absurdity, expresses the Consequence of his Doctrine thus;

That * *from the Necessity of the Divine Nature, infinite Things* (meaning infinite in number) *in infinite Manners must needs follow:*

* *Ex necessitate divinæ naturæ, infinita infinitis modis sequi debent. Ethic. Par. I. Prop. 16.*

But whoever reads his Demonstration of this Proposition, can hardly miss to observe, (if he be at all used to such Speculations,) that if it proved any thing at all, it would equally prove, That *from the Necessity of the Divine Nature, Only Infinite Things* (meaning Infinite in Extension) *can possibly arise.* Which Demonstration alone, is a sufficient Confutation of the Opinion it was designed to establish.

5thly,

*And
from the
Impossibi-
lity of an
Infinite
Successi-
on of
Causes.*

5^{thly}. If the Supreme Cause be not a Free and Voluntary Agent; then in every Effect, (for instance, in Motion,) there must have been a Progression of Causes *in infinitum*, without any Original Cause at all. For if there be no Liberty any where; then there is no Agent; no Cause, Mover, Principle, or Beginning of Motion any where: Every thing in the Universe must be *Passive*, and nothing *Active*; Every thing *Moved*, and no *Mover*; Every thing *Effect*, and nothing *Cause*. *Spinoza* indeed, (as has been already Observed) refers all things to the *Necessity of the Divine Nature*, as their real Cause and Original: But this is mere Cant, and Words without any Signification; and will not at all help him over the present Difficulty. For if by Things Existing through the Ne-

cessity

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Moti
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cessity
mean
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And
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and e
ly ow
meani
dum de
hac run

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cessity of the Divine Nature, he means *Absolutely* a *Necessity of Existence*; so as to make the World, and Every thing in it, *Self-Existent*; then it follows (as I have before shown) that it must be a Contradiction in terms, to suppose *Motion*, &c, not to Exist; which *Spinoza* himself is ashamed to assert. But if therefore by the *Necessity of the Divine Nature*, he means only the *Necessary following of an Effect from the Cause*, or, the *Cause necessarily producing its Effect*; this *Necessity* must still always be determined by something antecedent, and so on infinitely:

And this, *Spinoza* (though sometimes he seems to mean the other and equally absurd Sense) expressly owns in some Places to be his meaning: * *There can be no Voliti-*
* Una-quæq; Volitio non potest existere, ad operandum determinari; nisi ab alia causa determinetur, & hæc rursus ab alia, & sic porro in infinitum. Prop. 32. Dem.

L

an,

on, saith he, but from some Cause, which Cause must likewise be caused by some other Cause, and so on infinitely. Again, Will,

† Voluntas ad Dei naturam non magis pertinet, quam reliqua naturalia; sed ad ipsam eodem modo sese habet, ut motus & Quies.

Deus non magis dici potest ex libertate Voluntatis agere, quam dici potest ex libertate Motus & Quietis agere. Coroll. ad Prop, 32.

And what the Original of Motion and Rest is, he tells us, in these Words: * E-

* Corpus motum vel quiescens, ad motum vel quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel quietem determinatum fuit ab alio; & illud iterum ab alio; & sic in infinitum. Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.

† saith he, belongs to the Nature of God, no otherwise than Motion and Rest do; So that God can no more properly be said to Act by the Liberty of his Will, than by the Liberty of Motion and Rest. Every Body in Motion or at Rest, must have been determined to that Motion or Rest by some other Body, which must it self likewise have been determined by a third; and so on in infinitum

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fnitum. And thus, since Motion is not in any one of its Stages of Communication a Necessary Self-existing Being, (because the Body moved, may always without a Contradiction have been imagined to be at Rest, and is supposed not to have Motion from it self, but from another ;) the Opinion of Spinoza plainly recurs to *An Infinite Succession of dependent Beings produced one from another in an endless Progression, without any Original Cause at all.* Which Notion I have already (in the Proof of the second General Head of this Discourse) Demonstrated to imply a Contradiction. And since therefore there is no other possible way to avoid this Absurdity, but by granting that there must be somewhere a Principle of Motion and Action, which is Liberty ; I suppose it by this time sufficiently

proved, that the Supreme Cause must be a Being indued with Liberty and Choice.

That Liberty is not in it self an Impossible and contradictory Notion.

From what has been said upon this Head, it sufficiently appears, that Liberty is not in it self, and in the very Notion of the Thing, an absolute Contradiction and Impossibility; as the Pleaders for Necessity and Fate contend that it is, and place the chief strength of their Arguments in that Supposition. For that which actually is, is certainly not impossible: And it has already been proved, that Liberty actually is; nay, that it is impossible for it not to be, in the First and Supreme Cause. The Principal Argument used by the Maintainers of Fate against the Possibility of Liberty, is this: That since every thing must have a Cause, † every Voliti-

† Mens
ad hoc
vel illud
volendum de-

terminatur a Causa, quæ etiam ab alia determinata est, & hæc iterum ab alia, & sic in infinitum. *Spinoza Ethics. Par. II. Prop. 48.*

on or Determination of the Will of an Intelligent Being, must as all other things, arise from some Cause, and that Cause from some other Cause, and so on infinitely. But this very Argument really proves the direct contrary: For since every thing must indeed have a Cause of its Being, either from without, or in the Necessity of its own Nature; and it is a flat contradiction (as has already been demonstrated) to suppose an infinite Series of dependent Effects, none of which are Necessary in Themselves or Self-Existent; therefore it is impossible but there must be in the Universe Some Being, whose Existence is founded in the Necessity of its Own Nature, and who Being acted upon by Nothing beyond it self, must of Necessity have *in it self* a Principle of Acting, or

L 3 Power

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Power of beginning Motion, which is the Idea of Liberty. 'Tis true, this Argument proves only the Liberty of the First and Supreme Cause ; and extends not indeed to any Created Being : But it evinces in General, (which is sufficient to my present purpose,) that Liberty is so far from being impossible and contradictory in it self, that on the contrary it is impossible but that it must really Be somewhere ; and this being once established, it will be easie to shew hereafter that it is a Power capable of being communicated to Created Beings ; of which in its proper place.

*That the
Self-ex-
istent Be-
ing, must
be All-
powerful.*

X. The Self-Existent Being, the Supreme Cause of all things, must of Necessity have Infinite Power. This Proposition is evident, and unde-

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undeniable. For since nothing (as has been already proved) can possibly be Self-existent, besides Himself; and consequently all things in the Universe were made by Him, and are entirely dependent upon Him; and all the *Powers* of all Things are derived from Him, and must therefore be perfectly Subject and Subordinate to Him: 'Tis manifest that Nothing can make any Difficulty or Resistance to the Execution of his Will; but he must of necessity have absolute Power to do every thing he pleases, with the perfectest Ease, and in the perfectest Manner, at once and in a Moment, whenever he Wills it. The Descriptions the Scripture gives of *this Power*, are so lively and emphatical, that I cannot forbear mentioning one or two Passages: Thus *Job* 9. 4. *He is wise in Heart, and mighty in Strength;*---

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which

*which removeth the Mountains, and they know it not ; which overturneth them in his Anger : Which shaketh the Earth out of her place, and the Pillars thereof tremble : which commandeth the Sun, and it riseth not ; and Sealeth up the Stars : Which alone spreadeth out the Heavens, and treadeth upon the Waves of the Sea : Which doth great things past finding out, yea and Wonders without number. Again : Hell is naked before him, and Destruction hath no covering : He stretcheth out the North over the empty place, and hangeth the Earth upon nothing : He bindeth up the Waters in his thick Clouds, and the Cloud is not rent under them : The Pillars of Heaven tremble, and are astonished at his Reproof : He divideth the Sea with his Power, and by his Understanding he smiteth through the Proud : Lo, these are part of his Ways, but
how*

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how little a Portion is heard of him ?
but the Thunder of his Power, who
can understand ? Job 26. 6. So
likewise, Isaiah 40. 12. Who has
measured the Waters in the hollow of
his Hand ? and meted out Heaven
with the Span ? and comprehended
the Dust of the Earth in a Measure ?
and weighed the Mountains in Scales,
and the Hills in a Balance ? Behold,
the Nations are as a drop of the
Bucket, and are counted as the small
Dust of the Balance ; behold, he
taketh up the Isles, as a very little
thing : All Nations before him are
as nothing, and they are counted to
him less than nothing and Vanity :
To whom then will ye liken God, or
what likeness will ye compare unto
him ? I do not urge Authority to
the Persons I am at present speak-
ing to : But 'tis evident from Rea-
son, that the Supreme Cause must
of Necessity be Infinitely Powerful.

The

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The only Question is, what the true meaning of what we call *Infinite Power* is, and to what things it must be understood to extend, or not to extend.

Now in determining this Question, there are some Propositions, about which there is no dispute. Which therefore I shall but just mention : As

*Of work-
ing Con-
tradicti-
ons.*

1st. That infinite Power reaches all *Possible* things ; but cannot be said to extend to the working any thing which implies a Contradiction : As, that a Thing should *be* and *not be* at the same time ; that the same thing should *be made* and *not be made*, or *have been* and *not have been* ; that *twice two* should *not make four*, or that *That which is necessarily False*, should *be True*. The Reason whereof is plain : Because a Power of making a Thing to be, at the same time that it is
not ;

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not ; is only a Power of doing that which is Nothing, that is, no Power at all.

2dly. Infinite Power cannot be <sup>Or Natu-
ral and
Moral
Evils.</sup> said to extend to those things, which imply *Natural* Imperfection in the Being to whom such Power is ascribed : As, that it should destroy its own Being, weaken it self, or the like. * These Things imply *Natural* Imperfection ; and are by all Men confessed to be such, as cannot possibly belong to the Necessary Self-existent Being. There are also other things which imply Imperfection in another kind, viz. *Moral* Imperfection : Concerning which, Atheism takes away the Subject of the Question, by denying wholly the Difference of Moral Good and Evil ; and therefore I shall omit the Consideration of them, till I come to deduce the *Moral* Attributes of God.

But

But some other Instances there are, in the Question about the Extent of *Infinite Power*; wherein the Principal Difference between us and the Atheists, (next to the Question, whether the Supreme Cause be an *Intelligent Being*, or not,) does in a great measure consist. As

*Of the
Power of
Creating
Matter.*

1st. That Infinite Power includes a Power of Creating Matter. This has been constantly denied by all Atheists, both Antient and Modern; and as constantly affirmed by all who believe the Being, and have just Notions of the Attributes of God. The only Reason which the Atheists have, or can pretend to allege for *their* Opinion; is, that the Thing is in its own Nature absolutely *Impossible*. But how does it appear to be impossible? Why, Only because They are not able to comprehend *How* it can be. For, to reduce it to a
Con-

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Contradiction, (which is the alone real Impossibility,) this they are by no means able to do. For to say, that Something which once was not, may since have begun to exist; is neither directly, nor by any Consequence whatsoever, to assert that That which *is not*, can *be*, while it *is Not*; or that That which *is*, can *Not be*, while it *is*. 'Tis true, We, who have been used to converse only with Generations and Corruptions; and never saw any thing *Made* or *Created*, but only *Formed* or *Framed*; are apt to endeavour to conform our Idea of *Creation*, to that of *Formation*; and to imagine, that as in all *Formations* there is some Præexisting *Matter*, out of which a thing is *Formed*; so in *Creation* there must be considered a Præ-existent *Nothing*, out of which, as out of a real *Material Cause*, a thing is *Created*; which looks indeed

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deed like a Contradiction : But this is only a Confusion of Idea's ; just like Childrens imagining that Darknefs is some real thing, which in the Morning is driven away by the Light, or transformed into it : Whereas the true Notion of Creation, is not a *Forming* Something *Out of* Nothing, as out of a *Material Cause* ; but only a Bringing Something into Being, that before had no Being at all ; or a Causing Something to Exist Now, that did not Exist Before ; or which without this Cause, would not have Existed : Which no Man can ever reduce to a Contradiction ; any more than the *Formation* of any thing into a Shape which it had not before, can be reduced to a Contradiction. And indeed, if they would speak out the Truth, the Sum of what all Atheists, whether Antient or Modern, have e-

ver

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ver said upon this Head, amounts to no more but this One foolish Argument: That Matter could not begin to exist, when *it was not*; because this is supposing it to Be, before it was: and that it could not begin to Exist, when *it was*; because this is supposing it not to Be, after it was. Which is just such an Argument, as That whereby a Certain Philosopher Demonstrated, that there can be no such thing as *Motion* at all; because a Body can neither move in the Place where *it is*, nor in the place where *it is not*. The Arguments are exactly alike: And the same Answer will serve indifferently for them Both.

2ly. 'Tis Possible to Infinite ^{Of the} Power, to Create an *Immaterial* ^{Power of} Cogitative Substance, indued with ^{Creating} a Power of beginning Motion, and ^{Immate-} with a Liberty of Will or Choice. ^{rial Co-} ^{gitative} ^{Substan-} This ces.

This also has been always denied by all Atheists. And because it is a Proposition of the greatest Consequence to Religion and Morality, therefore I shall be particular in endeavouring the Proof of the several Parts of it.

First then, it is possible to infinite Power, to Create an *Immaterial* Cogitative Substance. That there can be such a Thing as a Cogitative Substance, that is, a Substance indued with Consciousness and Thought, is granted by all ; because every Man's own Experience convinces him, that He himself is such a Substance. Further, That if there be, or can be, any such thing as Immaterial Substances ; that then it is most reasonable to Believe, that such Substances as are indued with Consciousness and Thought, [Properties the farthest distant from the known
Proper-

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Properties of Matter, and the most unlike them, that can possibly be imagined,] are those Immaterial Substances; will also, I think, be granted by all Men. The only thing therefore, that remains to be proved, is this; That *Immaterial* Substances are not impossible, or, That a Substance *Immaterial* is not a contradictory Notion. Now whoever asserts that it is contradictory; must affirm, that whatever is not Matter, is nothing; and that to say Any thing Exists which is not Matter, is saying that there Exists something which is nothing. Which in Other Words is plainly this; That whatever we have no Idea of, is nothing, and impossible to Be. For there is no other way to reduce *Immaterial* Substance to a Contradiction, but by supposing *Immaterial* to Signifie the

M same

same as *Having no Existence* ; And there is no possible way to prove That, but by saying we have no Idea of it, and therefore it neither has nor can have any Existence. By which same Argument (even supposing it true, which yet is indeed most false, that we have a clear Idea of the Essence of Matter, and none at all of any Immaterial Substance,) a Man Born Blind may Demonstrate irrefragably, that *Light* or *Colour* is an Impossible and Contradictory Notion, because it is not a *Sound* or a *Smell*. For the Power of *seeing Light* or *Colour*, is to a Man Born Blind, altogether as incomprehensible and absolutely beyond the Reach of all his Ideas, as either the Operations and Perceptions, or even the Simple Essence of a Pure Immaterial Substance or Spirit, can be to any

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any of Us. If therefore the Blind
Mans want of Idea's be not a
sufficient Proof of the Impossibi-
lity of Light or Colour ; how
comes our bare want of Idea's,
to be a Demonstration of the Im-
possibility of the Being of Imma-
terial Substances ? A Blind Man,
they will say, has *Testimony* of the
Existence of Light : Very true ;
so also have we, of the Existence
of Immaterial Substances : But, I
hope, an Atheist will not put
the Issue of his Cause upon *Testi-*
mony, whatever he does. But
there is this further advantage on
our side in the Comparifon ; that a
Blind man, excepting the Testimo-
ny of *Others*, finds not by any rea-
soning with himself, the least like-
lihood or probability, no not in the
lowest possible degree, that there
can be any fuch thing as Light or
Colour ; But we, besides Testi-
M 2 mony,

mony, have great and strong Arguments both from Experience and Reason, that there are such things as Immaterial Substances, though we have no Knowledge of their Simple Essence. Even the very first and most universal Principle of Gravitation it self in all inanimate Matter; since it is ever Proportional, not at all to the *Surfaces* of Bodies or of their Particles in any possible Supposition, but entirely to the *Solid Content* of Bodies; 'tis evident it cannot be caused by Matter acting upon the *Surfaces* of Matter, which is all it can do; but must be caused by something which continually penetrates its *Solid Substance*. But in *Animals*, which have a Power of Self-motion; and in the perfecter Sorts of them, which have still higher Faculties; the thing is yet more evident. For we see and feel

and

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and observe daily in our selves and others, such Powers and Operations and Perceptions, as undeniably evince themselves either to be the Properties of Immaterial Substances : Or else it will follow that Matter is Something, of whose inmost Substance and Essential Powers we have altogether as little Idea, as we have of Immaterial Beings ; and then how are Immaterial Substances more impossible than Material ? But of this, more hereafter.

From what has been said on *Of the* this Head, it will be easy to answer all the Objections that have *Immateriality of Human Souls.* been brought by any Atheists, against the Notion of Human Souls being Immaterial Substances distinct from Body. For since 'tis possible there may be such things as Immaterial Substances ; and since if any such Substance *Can Be,*

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there is all the Reason in the World to Believe that Conscious and Thinking Substance *Is* such; these Properties being the most Remote from the known Properties of Matter, that are possible to be conceived; The Foundation of all the Objections against the Immateriality of the Soul, is entirely taken away. I shall not now Tarry to Consider the Objections in particular, which have been often and fully answered by learned Pens; but shall only mention One, on which all the rest depend, and to which they may all be reduced. And it is This:

* — Si immortalis
natura animai est,

Et sentire potest secreta a corpore nostro;

Quinq; (ut opinor) etiam faciundum est *Sensibus* auctam :

Nec ratione alia nosmet proponere nobis

* That seeing the only means we have of Perception, are the Five Senses; and these all plainly depend upon the Organs of the Body; therefore the Soul

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Soul without the Body, can have no Perception, and consequently is Nothing. Now (besides that these very Senses or Perceptions, however they may be obstructed by bodily Indisposition, and so do indeed depend upon the Organs of the Body as to their present *Exercise*, yet in their *Nature* are really entirely distinct Powers, and cannot possibly, as has been before shown, be absolutely founded in, or arise from, any of the known Properties or Qualities of Matter: Besides this, I say;) of Him that thus argues, I would only ask this one Question: Are our Five Senses, by an

Possumus infernas animas Acherunte vagare:

Pictores itaq; & scriptorum secla priora

Sic animas introduxerunt sensibus auctas.

At neq; seorsum oculi, &c.---

Nec sensus ipsi seorsum consistere possunt

Naribus atq; manu, atq; oculis, atq; auribus, atq;

Lingua; nec per se possunt sentire, nec esse. *Lucret. lib. 3.*

Ὅσων γὰρ εἰσιν αἰσθῶν ἢ ἐνέργεια σωματικῇ, δῆλον ὅτι ταύταις ἀνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν διὸν βαλίζεν ἀνευ ποδῶν. *Aristot.*

Absolute Necessity in the Nature of the Thing, All and the only Possible Ways of Perception? And is it impossible and contradictory, that there should be any Being in the Universe, indued with ways of Perception different from these that are the result of *Our* present Composition? Or are these things on the contrary purely *Arbitrary*; and the same Power that gave *Us* these, may have given Others to *Other Beings*, and might (if he had pleas'd) have given *Us* Others in this *present* State, and may yet have made us capable of different Ones in *Another* State? If they be purely *Arbitrary*; then the want of these, does by no means infer a total want of Perception; but the same Soul, which in the present State has the Powers of *Reflexion*, *Reason* and *Judgment*, which are Faculties entirely different from Sense;

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Sense ; may as easily in another State have different ways even of Perception also ; But if any one say, that these Senses of ours, are Necessarily the only ways of Perception ; how does that appear ? And is it not infinitely more reasonable to suppose, that this is a * mere Prejudice arising from Custom and an attending to bare Sense in opposition to Reason ? For suppose Men had been created only with Four Senses, and had never known the use of Sight ; would they not then have had the same Reason to conclude there were but Four possible ways of Perception, as they have Now to fancy that there are but

† Has tamen imagines [mortuorum] Loqui volebant ; quod fieri nec sine lingua, nec sine palato, nec sine faucibus, laterum, pulmonum vi & figura potest. Nihil enim Animo (speaking of such as attributed to Spirits the same Powers and Senses only, as they saw Men endued with in this present State,) videre poterant : Ad oculos omnia referebant. Magni autem ingenii est, revocare mentem a sensibus, & cogitationem a Consuetudine abducere. Cicero Tuscul. Quæst. I.

Five ?

Five ? And would they not then have thought *Sight* to have been an Impossible, Chimerical, and merely imaginary Power ; with absolutely the same Reason, as they now presume the Faculties of immaterial Beings to be so ? that is, with *no Reason at all*. One would think, Men should be ashamed therefore to be so Vain, as merely from their own Negative Ignorance, without any appearance or pretence of any Positive Argument, to argue against the Possibility of the Being of Things, which (excepting Only that they cannot frame to themselves an Image or Notion of them) there is a Concurrence of all the Reasons in the World to perswade them that such Things Really are. And then as to the Difficulty of Conceiving the Nature and Manner of the Union between Soul and Body :

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dy : We know altogether as much of That, as we do of the Nature of the Union or Cohæſion of the infinitely diviſible parts of Body to Body ; which yet no Man doubts of : And therefore our Ignorance can be no more an Argument againſt the Truth of the One, than it is a Bar to our Belief of the Other.

Secondly, It is poſſible to Inſi-Of indu-
nite Power, to indue a Creature^{ing Crea-}
with *the Power of Beginning Motion.*^{tures with}
This is conſtantly denied by all^{the Pow-}
Atheiſts ; becauſe the Conſe-^{er of be-}
quence of it, is a *Liberty of Will,*^{ginning}
of which I ſhall have Occaſion to^{Motion.}
ſpeak preſently. But that the
Propoſition is true, I thus prove.
If the Power of Beginning Moti-
on be in it ſelf a *Poſſible Thing* ;
and alſo be *Poſſible to be commu-*
nicated ; Then a Creature may be
indued with That Power. Now
that

that the Power of Beginning Motion is in it self a *Possible Thing*, I have already proved, by showing that there must *Necessarily* be *somewhere* a Power of Beginning motion; because otherwise *Motion* must have been from Eternity, without any *External Cause* of its Being; and yet it is a Thing that has no Necessity of Existence in its *own Nature*; So that if there be not *somewhere* a Principle or Power of beginning Motion; *Motion* must Exist, without any Cause or Reason at all of its Existence, either *within* it self or *from without*; which, as I have before shown, is an Express Contradiction: Wherefore a Principle or Power of Beginning Motion, there must of necessity Be, *somewhere* or *Other*; and Consequently it is not in it self an Impossible thing. I add: As a Power of Beginning Motion,
is

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is not in it self an Impossible Thing ; because it must of Necessity Be in the Supreme Cause : So neither is it impossible to be *Communicated* to Created Beings. The Reason is plain : Because no Powers are Impossible to be Communicated, but only those which imply Self-Existence and Absolute Independency. That a Subordinate Being should be Self-Existent or absolutely Independent, is indeed a Contradiction ; but 'tis no Contradiction to suppose it indued with any Other Power whatsoever, separate from these. I know the Maintainers of Fate, are very Confident that a Power of Beginning Motion, is nothing less than being really Independent, or being able to Act Independently from any Superior Cause. But this is only a childish trifling with Words. For a Power of Acting
in-

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independently *in this Sense*, Communicated at the Pleasure of the Supreme Cause, and Continued only during the same good Pleasure, is no more a real and absolute Independency, than the Power of *Existing*, (which I suppose the Defenders of *Eate* are not so fond to make a Continual Creation, as they are to make the power of Self-Motion a Continual External Impulse,) or than the power of *being Conscious*, or any other *Power* whatsoever, can be said to imply Independency. In reality, 'tis altogether as hard to conceive, how *Consciousness* or the power of *Perception* should be communicated to a Created Being; as how the power of *Self-Motion* should be so: unless Perception be Nothing else but a meer Passive Reception of Impulse; which I suppose is as clear that it is not, as that a

Trian-

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Triangle is not a Sound, or that a Globe is not a Colour. Yet no Man doubts, but that He Himself and all others have truly a Power of Perception: And therefore in like manner, (however hard it may be to Conceive, as to the manner of it; yet since, as has now been proved, it can never be shewn to be impossible and expressly contradictory, that a power of Self-Motion should be communicated,) I suppose no considering Man can doubt, but that he actually has also a Power of *Self-Motion*. For the Arguments drawn from continual Experience and Observation, to prove that we have such a Power, are so strong; that nothing less than a strict Demonstration that the thing is absolutely impossible and implies an express Contradiction, can make us in the least doubt that we have it.

not.

not. We have all the same Experience, the same Marks and Evidence exactly, of our having *Really* a power of Self-motion; that the rigidest Fatalist could possibly contrive to require, if he was to make a *Supposition* of a Man's being endued with that power: There is no One Thing, which such a Man can imagine ought to follow from the Supposition of Liberty, which every Man does not Now as much Feel and actually Experience in Himself, as it can possibly be imagined any Man would do, supposing the Thing were true. Wherefore to affirm, notwithstanding all this, that the Spirits by which a man moves the Members of his Body, and ranges the Thoughts of his Mind, are themselves moved wholly by Air or Subtler Matter inspired into the
Body

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Body; and That again by other external Matter, and so on; as the Wheels of a Clock are moved by the Weights, and those Weights by Gravitation, and so on; without a mans having the least power by any Principle within himself, to think any one Thought, or impell his own Spirits in order to move any Member of his Body; All this is so contrary to Experience and the Reason of Things, that unless the Idea of Self-motion were in it self as evidently and Clearly a Contradiction, as that two and two should make fifteen, a Man ought to be ashamed to talk at that Rate. Nay a Man of any considerable degree of Modesty, would even in that Case be almost tempted rather to doubt the Truth of his Faculties; than boldly assert one so intolerable an Absurdity, only to avoid another.

N

ther. There are some indeed, who denying Men the Power of *Beginning Motion*, would yet seem in some manner to account for their Actions, by allowing them a Power of *Determining Motion*. But this also is a mere ludicrous trifling with Words. For if that Power of *Determining Motion* be no other in a Man, than that which is in a Stone of Reflecting a Ball *one certain way*; this is just Nothing at all: But if he has a Power of *Determining* the Motion of his Spirits *any way*, as he himself pleases; this is in all Respects the very same as the Power of *Beginning Motion*.

Of the
Possibility
of indu-
ing a
Creature
with
Freedom
or Liber-
ty of Will.

Thirdly, 'Tis Possible to Infinite Power, to indue a Creature with Freedom or Liberty of Will. It might suffice that this is at once proved by the same Arguments, and in the same Method, as I just

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just now proved *Self-Motion* or a *Power of beginning Motion*, to be possible: *viz.*, Because *Liberty* must of necessity Be in the Supreme Cause, (as is at large proved in the *Ninth General Head* of this Discourse,) and therefore cannot be impossible and contradictory in the Nature of the thing it self: And because it implies no Contradiction to suppose it *communicated*; as being no harder to conceive, than the forementioned *Power of Beginning Motion*: And because the Arguments drawn from Experience and Observation, are stronger on the one side of the Question, than those arising merely from the Difficulty of our apprehending the thing, can be on the other. But forasmuch as this is the Question of the greatest Concern of all, in Matters both of Religion and Humane Life; and both *Spinoza* and *Mr. Hobbs*, and

their Followers, have with great Noise and Confidence denied it : I shall therefore, not contenting myself with this, endeavour to shew moreover, in particular, the weakness of the principal Arguments, by which these Men have pretended to demonstrate, that there cannot *possibly* be any such Power in Man, as a Liberty of Will. As to the Propriety of the Terms, whether the Will be properly the Seat of Liberty or not, it is not now to the purpose to inquire : The Question being, not where the Seat of Liberty is ; but whether there be *at all* in Man any such Power, as a Liberty of Choice and of Determining his own Actions ; or on the contrary his Actions be all as Necessary, as the Motions of a Clock. The Arguments by which *Spinoza* and *Mr. Hobbs* have attempted to maintain this latter

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side of the Question, are all plainly reducible to these two.

1st. That since every Effect must needs be produced by some Cause; therefore as every Motion in a Body must have been caused by the Impulse of some other Body, and the Motion of that by the Impulse of a Third; so every Volition, or Determination of the Will of Man, must needs be produced by some External Cause, and that in like manner be the Effect of some Third: And consequently that there cannot possibly be any such Thing in Nature, as Liberty or Freedom of Will.

2^{dly}. That Thinking, and all its Modes, as Willing and the like, are Qualities or Affections of Matter: and consequently, since 'tis manifest that Matter has not in it self a Power of Beginning Moti-

on, or giving it self any manner of Determination whatsoever; therefore 'tis evident likewise that 'tis impossible there should be any such Thing as Freedom of Will.

*An Answer to
M. Hobbes
and Spinoza's
Arguments a-
gainst the
Possibility
of Liber-
ty.*

Now to these Arguments I oppose, and shall endeavour briefly to Demonstrate, the three following Propositions.

1st. That every Effect cannot possibly be the product of external Causes, but there must of Necessity be Somewhere a Beginning of Operation, or a Power of Acting without being antecedently acted upon: And that this Power may be, and is, in Man.

2^{dly}. That Thinking and Wiling neither are, nor can be, Qualities or Affections of Matter; and consequently not concluded under the Laws thereof.

3^{dly} That

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3dly. That even supposing the Soul not to be a distinct Substance from Body, but that Thinking and Willing could be, and were indeed, only Qualities or Affections of Matter; yet even *This* would not at all Affect the present Question, nor prove Freedom of Will to be impossible.

1st. Every Effect cannot possibly be the Product of external Causes; but there must of Necessity be somewhere a Beginning of Operation, or a Power of Acting without being antecedently acted upon: and this Power may be, and Is, in Man. The several parts of this Proposition have been already proved in the *Second* and *Ninth* General Heads of this Discourse, and in that part of this *Tenth* Head which is concerning the Possibility of the Power of Self-Motion being communi-

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cated to Created Beings. I shall not therefore here repeat the Proofs; but only apply them to *Spinoza's* and *Mr Hobbs's* Arguments, so far as is necessary to show the weakness of what they have said upon this Head in Opposition to the Possibility of Liberty or Freedom of Will. The manner then of their Arguing upon this Head, is this. That Every Effect must needs be owing to some Cause; and That Cause must produce the Effect * necessarily;

* Quicumque unquam Effectus productus sit, productus est a causa necessaria. Nam quod productum est, eo ipso quod productum est causam habuit integram, hoc est, omnia ea quibus suppositis Effectum non sequi intelligi non possit: ea vero causa necessaria est. *Hobbs Philosophia prima, cap. 9.*

because if it be a sufficient Cause, the Effect cannot but follow; and if it be not a sufficient Cause, it will not be at

all

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all a Cause of that Thing : Thus,

for instance, † whatever Body is moved, must be moved by some other Body, which it self likewise must be moved by some Third, and so on without End : That the || Will, in like manner, of any voluntary Agent, must of necessity be determined by some external Cause, and not by any Power

† Corpus motum vel quiescens ad motum vel Quietem determinari debuit ab alio corpore, quod etiam ad motum vel Quietem determinatum fuit ab alio, & illud iterum ab alio, & sic in infinitum. *Spinoza Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 13. Lemma 3.*

|| Unaquæque Volitio non potest Existere, neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia causa determinetur, & hæc rursus ab alia; & sic porro in infinitum.

Id: Ethic. Par. I. Prop: 32. Demonstrat.

I conceive, nothing taketh beginning from it self, but from the Action of some immediate Agent without it self. And that therefore when first a Man had an Appetite or Will to something, to which immediately before he had no Appetite or Will, the Cause of his Will is not the Will it self, but something else not in his own disposing: *Hobbs's Debate with Bp. Bramhall, p. 289.*

In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas; sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quæ etiam ab alia determinata est, & hæc iterum ab alia, & sic in infinitum. *Spinoza, Ethic. Par. II. Prop. 48.*

of

of determining it self, inherent in it self; And That External Cause must be determined necessarily by some other Cause, External to It; and so on without End. From all which it evidently appears, that All that these Men urge against the Possibility of Freedom, extends equally to all other Beings (not excepting the Supreme) as well as to Men; and † Spinoza

† Hinc sequitur, De-
am non operari ex li-
bertate Voluntatis. E-
thic. Par. I. Coroll. ad
Prop. 32.

in exprefs Words confesses it: Wherefore consequently, whatever noise they make of

the mighty Strength and Demonstrative Force of their Arguments, All that they say, amounts to no more but this One most Absurd Conclusion; That *there is no where, nor can possibly be, any Principle of Motion or Beginning of Operation at all; but every thing is caused necessarily by an eternal Chain of Dependent Causes*

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ses and Effects, without any Independent Original. All their Arguments therefore on this Head, are already answered in the *Second* and *Ninth* General Heads of this Discourse; (where I proved that there must of necessity be an *Original, Independent, and Free Principle of Motion or Action*; and that to suppose an endless Succession of Dependent Causes and Effects, without any Original or First and Self-actuating Principle, is supposing a *Series of dependent Things to be from Eternity* produced by *Nothing*; which is the very same Absurdity and Contradiction, as to suppose Things produced by *Nothing at any definite Time*; the Ability of Nothing to produce any thing, being plainly the same in *Time* or in *Eternity*.) And I have moreover proved *ex abundanti*, in the foregoing part of this
Tenth

Tenth Head, that the Power of Beginning Motion is not only possible and certain in it self, but also possible to be communicated to Finite Beings, and actually Is in Man.

That Thinking and Willing, neither are, nor can be Affections of Matter.

2dly. Thinking and Willing neither are, nor can be, Qualities or Affections of Matter; and consequently are not concluded under the Laws thereof. That 'tis possible there may be Immaterial Substances, the Notion not implying a Contradiction in it self; hath already been shown under the present General Proposition. Further, that Thinking and Willing are Powers entirely Different from Solidity, Figure, and Motion; and if they be Different, that then they cannot possibly arise from them, or be compounded of them; hath likewise been already proved under the *Eighth* General Head of this

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this Discourse. It follows therefore, that Thinking and Willing *may possibly be*, nay that they *certainly and necessarily are* Faculties or Powers of Immaterial Substances: Seeing they *cannot possibly be* Qualities or Affections of *Matter*; unless we will confound (as some have done) the Ideas of things; and mean by *Matter*, not, what the Word commonly is used to signify, a Solid Substance, capable of Division, Figure and Motion; but an unknown Substance, capable of Powers or Properties entirely different from these: In which Sense of the Word, could *Matter* be supposed never so capable of Thinking and Willing; yet in that Sense, (as I shall show presently) it would signify nothing at all, to the Purpose or Advantage of our Adversaries. In the mean time, how great an Absurdity

furdity it is, to suppose Think-
ing and Willing to be Qualities
or Affections of Matter, in the
Proper and Usual Sense of the
Word; may sufficiently appear,
without any foreign Argument,
from the Senselessness of Mr Hobbs's
Own Explication of the Nature
and Original of Sensation and
Consciousness. *The Immediate Cause*
*of Sensation, * saith*

* Ex quo intelligi-
tur, Sensationis immedi-
atam causam esse in eo,
quod Sensationis Orga-
num primum & tangit
& premit. Si enim or-
gani pars extrema pre-
matur; illa cedente,
premetur quoq; pars
quæ versus interiora illi
proxima est; & ita pro-
pagabitur pressio, five
motus ille, per partes
Organi Omnes, usq; ad
intimam.——Quo-
niam autem motui ab
objecto per media ad
Organi partem inti-

he, is this: *The Ob-*
ject, or Something flow-
ing from it, presseth the
outermost part of the
Organ, and that Pres-
sure is communicated to
the innermost Parts of
the Organ; Where by
the Resistance or Reacti-
on of the Organ, cau-
sing a Pressure outwards,
contrary to the Pressure
of the Object inwards,
there

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Cap.

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there is made up a Phantasm, or Image: Which Phantasm, † saith he, is the Sensation it self. Again; The Cause of Sensation, || saith he, is an Object pressing the Organ; which Pressure is by means of the Nerves conveyed to the Brain, and so to the Heart;

tanquam aliquid situm extra Organum. *Hobbs de Sensatione & motu animali.*

† Phantasma est sentiendi Actus: *Id. lib. 1.*

|| Causa sensationis est Externum Corpus sive Objectum, quod premit Organum proprium; & premendo, (mediantibus Nervis & Membranis,) continuum efficit Motum introrsum ad Cerebrum & inde ad Cor; unde nascitur Cordis resistentia & contrapressio seu *antiturbula* sive Conatus Cordis liberantis se a pressione per motum tendentem extrorsum; qui motus propterea apparet tanquam aliquid externum: Atq; Apparitio hæc, sive Phantasma, est id quod vocamus *Sensationem*. *Leviathan Cap. 1.*

nam propagato, fit aliqua totius Organi resistentia sive reactio, per motum ipsius Organi internum naturalem; fit propterea conatus ab objecto, conatus ab Organo contrarius: Ut cum conatus ille ad intima, ultimus actus sit eorum qui fiunt in actu Sensationis; tum demum ex ea reactione aliquandiu durante, ipsum existit Phantasma; quod propter conatum versus externa, semper videtur

where

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where by the Resistance or Counter-pressure of the Heart outwards, is made an Image or Phantasm, which is Sensation. Now what is there in all this, that does in any the least measure tend to explain or make intelligible the real and inward Nature of Sense or Consciousness? The Object, by communicating a Pressure through the Organ to the Sensory, does indeed raise a Phantasm or Image, that is, make a certain Impression on the Brain: But Wherein consists the Power of Perceiving this Impression, and of being Sensible of it? Or what Similitude hath this Impression to the Sense it self, that is, to the Thought excited in the Mind? why, exactly the very same, that a Square has to Blueness, or a Triangle to Sound, or a Needle to the Sense of Pain; or the Reflecting of a Tennis-Ball, to the Reason
and

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and Understanding of a Man. So that Mr. Hobbs's Definition of Sensation; that it is it self, the inmost and formal Nature of it, nothing but the Phantasm or Image made in the Brain by the Pressure communicated from the Object; is in other Words, defining *Blueness* to be the Image of a *Square*, or *Sound* the Picture of a *Triangle*, or *Pain* the Similitude of a *Sharp-pointed Needle*. I do not here misrepresent him in the least. For He himself expressly confesses, * that all Sensible Qualities, such as Colour, Sound and the like, are in the Objects themselves nothing but Motion; And because Motion can produce Nothing but Motion, (as likewise 'tis evident that Figure and

* Quæ qualitates Omnes nominari solent sensibiles, & sunt in ipso objecto nihil aliud præter materiæ motum, quo Objectum in Organa Sensuum diversimode operatur. Neq; in Nobis aliud sunt, quam diversi motus. Motus enim nihil generat præter motum. *Leviathan cap. 1.*

all its possible Compositions can produce nothing but Figure,) therefore in Us also the Perceptions of these sensible Qualities are nothing but different Motions. If then the Phantasm, that is, the Image of the Object made in the Brain by Figure and Motion, be (as he says) the Sensation it self; is not Sensation, bare Figure and Motion? And are not all the forementioned Absurdities, unavoidable Consequences of his Opinion?

Mr. Hobbs, (as I have elsewhere observed,) seems indeed not to have been altogether unaware of this insuperable Difficulty; But he industriously indeavours to conceal it from his Readers, and to impose upon them by the ambiguity of the Word *Phantasm*. Yet for a Reserve, in case he should be too

* Scio fuisse Philosophos quosdam, eos

hard pressed,* he gives us a Hint, that possi-

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bly Sensation may be something more, viz. a Power of Perception or Consciousness naturally and essentially inherent in all Matter ; only that it wants the Organs and Memory of Animals to express its Sensation : And † that, as a Man, if he were supposed to have no other Sense but Seeing, and That so ordered, as that his Eyes

demq; viros doctos, qui corpora omnia Sensu prædita esse sustinuerunt : Nec video, si natura Sensationis in reactione sola collocaretur, quomodo refutari possint. Sed etsi ex reactione etiam corporum aliorum phantasma aliquod nasceretur, illud tamen remoto objecto statim cessaret : Nam nisi ad retinendum Motum impressum, etiam remoto objecto, apta habeant Organa, ut habent Animalia ; ita tantum sentient, ut nunquam sensisse se recordentur.

— Sensationi ergo, quæ vulgo ita appellatur, necessario adhæret memoria aliqua, &c. *Hobbs Phys. cap. 25. Sect. 5.*

† Itaq; & Sensationi adhæret proprie dictæ, ut ei aliqua insita sit perpetua phantasmatum varietas ; ita ut aliud ab alio discerni possit. Si supponemus enim esse hominem, oculis quidem claris cæterisq; videndi Organis recte se habentibus compositum, nullo autem alio sensu præditum, eumq; ad eandem rem eodem semper colore & specie sine ulla vel minima varietate apparentem obversum esse ; mihi certe, quicquid dicant alii, non Videre videretur. — Attonitum esse, & fortasse Aspectare eum, sed stupentem dicerem, videre non dicerem : Adeo Sentire semper idem, & Non Sentire, ad idem recidunt. *Id. Ibid.*

were always immoveably fixed upon one and the same Object, and That also unchangeable and without any the least variety; such a Man could not properly be said to see, but only to be under an unintelligible kind of Amazement: So all unorganized Bodies may possibly have Sensation or Perception; but because for want of Organs there is no Variety in it, neither any Memory or Means of expressing that Sensation, therefore to Us it seems as if they had no such Thing at all. This Opinion, I say, Mr. Hobbs mentions as possible: But he does it with such Hesitancy, Diffidence and Sparingness, as shows plainly that he meant it only as a last Refuge, or rather Subterfuge, to recur to, when he should be pressed with the forementioned Absurdities unavoidably Consequent upon the Supposition of Sensation being only Figure and

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Motion. And indeed well might he be sparing, and, as it were, Ashamed of this Subterfuge: For it is a Thing altogether as absurd, as even the other Opinion it self, of Thought being mere Motion: For what can be more Ridiculous, than to imagine that Matter is essentially Conscious, as it is extended? Will it not follow from that Supposition, that every piece of Matter, being made up of endlessly divisible parts, is made up also of innumerable Consciousnesses and infinite Confusion? But 'tis a shame to trouble the *Reader* with so much as the mention of any of the Numberless Absurdities following from that Monstrous Supposition. Others therefore, who would make Thinking to be an Affection of *Matter*, and yet are Ashamed to use either of the fore-mentioned ways, Contend that *God*

by his Almighty and Supreme Power indues certain Systems of Matter with a Faculty of Thinking, according to his own Good Pleasure. But this also amounts to Nothing. For either our Idea of *Matter*, is a true Idea; or it is not. If it be a true Idea, that *Matter* is Nothing but a Solid Substance, capable only of Division, Figure and Motion, with the Effects of their several Compositions; as it appears to Us, upon the best Examination we are able to make of it; then it is absolutely Impossible for Thinking to belong to *Matter*, because Thinking cannot possibly arise from any Modification or Composition of any or all of these Qualities: But if any Man will say that our Idea of *Matter* is wrong; and that by *Matter* he will not mean, as other Men do, a Solid Substance, capable on-
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ly of Division, Figure and Motion, with the Effects of their several Compositions ; but an unknown Substance, capable of Thinking and of numberless unknown Properties besides ; then he trifles only, in putting an ambiguous Signification upon the Word *Matter*, and making it mean the same as we mean by *Substance* : And in that Sense to suppose Thinking or any other Active Property possible to be in *Matter*, as signifying only a Substance of which we have no Idea ; would make Nothing at all to the present Purpose in our Adversaries Advantage, and is at least Not a clearer and more Intelligible way of Talking, than to Attribute the same Properties to an Immaterial Substance, and keep the Idea of *Matter* and its Properties clear and distinct. For I affirm,

*That if
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and Wil-
ling were
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of Mat-
ter, yet
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theless
Liberty
might be
possible.*

3dly. That even supposing (in these Mens confused way) that the Soul was really not a distinct Substance from Body, but that Thinking and Willing could be, and were indeed only Qualities or Affections of *Matter*; yet even *This* would not at all Affect the present Question about *Liberty*, nor prove Freedom of Will to be an impossible Thing. For, since it has been already demonstrated, that Thinking and Willing cannot possibly be Effects or Compositions of Figure and Motion; Whosoever will make Thinking and Willing to be Qualities or Affections of *Matter*, must suppose *Matter* capable of certain Properties entirely different from Figure and Motion; And if it be capable of Properties entirely different from Figure and Motion, then it can never be proved from the Effects of Figure and Motion

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Motion being all Necessary, that the Effects of other and totally distinct Properties must likewise be Necessary.

Mr *Hobbs* therefore, and his *A shameful*
Followers, are guilty of a most *ful Fal-*
shameful Fallacy in that very Ar-*lacy of*
gument, wherein they place their *M.Hobbs*
main and chief strength. For, *and his*
supposing Matter to be capable of *Follow-*
Thinking and Willing, they con-
tend that the Soul is mere Matter;
and Knowing that the Effects of
Figure and Motion must needs be
all necessary, they conclude that the
Operations of the Mind must All
therefore be Necessary : That is :
When they would prove the Soul
to be mere Matter ; then they
suppose Matter capable, not only
of Figure and Motion, but also of
other unknown Properties : And
when they would prove the Will
and all other Operations of the
Soul

Soul to be Necessary ; then they de-
 vest Matter again of all its Un-
 known Properties, and make it
 mere Solidity endued only with
 Figure and Motion, again. Where-
 fore, distinguishing their Ambigu-
 ous and Confused use of the Word
Matter, they are unavoidably re-
 duced to One of these two Con-
 cessions. If by *Matter* they mean
 a Solid Substance endued only
 with Figure and Motion ; then the
 Soul cannot be mere matter ; be-
 cause (as Mr. *Hobbs* himself * con-
 fesses) Figure and Motion can pro-
 duce nothing but Figure and Mo-
 tion ; and consequently (as hath
 been before demonstrated) they
 can never produce so much as any
 Secondary Quality, [*Sound, Co-
 lour, and the like,*] much less Think-
 ing and Reasoning : From whence
 it follows, that the Soul being
 unavoidably something Immaterial,
 al,

* *Motus*
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 Cap. I.

al, they have no Argument left to prove that it cannot have a *Power of Beginning Motion*, which is a plain Instance of *Liberty*. But if, on the other hand, they will mean by *Matter* an Unknown Substance, capable of Properties totally different from Figure and Motion ; then they must no longer argue against the Possibility of *Liberty*, from the Effects of Figure and Motion being all unavoidably Necessary ; because *Liberty* will not consist in the Effects of Figure and Motion, but in those Other Unknown Properties of Matter, which these Men can no more explain or argue about, than about Immaterial Substances. The Truth therefore is, they must needs Suppose Thinking, to be merely an Effect or Composition of Figure and Motion, if they will give any strength to their Arguments.

ments against Liberty : And then the Question will be, not whether God can make *Matter* think, or no ; (for in that Question they only trifle with a Word, abusing the Word *Matter* to signify *Substance* in general ;) but the Question is, whether *Figure and Motion*, in any Composition or Division, can possible Be *Perception and Thought*: which (as has been before said) is just such a Question, as if a Man should ask, whether it be Possible that a *Triangle* should be a *Sound*, or a *Globe* a *Colour*. The Sum is this : If the Soul be an Immaterial Substance, (as it must needs be, if we have any true Idea of Matter,) then Mr. *Hobbs's* Arguments against the Possibility of Liberty, drawn all from the Properties of Matter, are idle and nothing to the Purpose : But if our Adversaries will be so absurd as to contend, that the Soul is nothing

thing but mere *Matter* ; Then either they must mean by *Matter* an unknown Substance indued with Active as well as Passive Properties ; which is confounding and taking away our Idea of *Matter*, and at the same Time destroying all their own Arguments against Liberty, which they have founded wholly on the known Properties of Matter : Or else they must speak out, as they mean, that Thinking and Willing are nothing but Effects and Compositions of Figure and Motion ; which I have already shown to be a Contradiction in Terms.

There are some other Arguments against the Possibility of *Liberty*, which Men by attempting to answer, have made to appear considerable ; when really they are altogether beside the Question. As for Instance, those drawn from
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the Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding ; And from the Certainty of the Divine Præscience.

Of the Will being necessarily determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding.

As to the former, viz : *The Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of the Understanding :* This is only a Necessity upon Supposition ; that is to say, a Necessity that a Man should *Will* a Thing, when it is supposed that he *does Will* it ; just as if one should affirm, that every thing which *Is*, is therefore Necessary to Be, because when it *Is*, it cannot but Be. For the *last Judgment of the Understanding* is nothing else but a Man's final Determining, (after more or less Consideration,) either to Choose or not to Choose a thing ; that is, it is the very same with the *Act of Volition*. But besides ; supposing the last Judgment of the Un-

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Understanding was really a different Thing from the *Act of Volition*, and that the One *Necessarily* produced the other; yet this *Necessity* of a Man's *Willing* to act according to his last *Judgment*, would at most even upon That Supposition, be only a *Moral*, and not properly a *Natural Necessity*; that is, it would be *no Necessity at all*, in the Sense of the Opposers of Liberty. For *Moral Necessity*, is evidently consistent with the most perfect *Natural Liberty*. For instance: A Man entirely free from all Pain of Body and Disorder of Mind, judges it unreasonable for him to Hurt or Destroy Himself; and, being under no Temptation or External Violence, he *cannot possibly* Act contrary to this Judgment; not because he wants a *Natural Power* to do so, but because it is absurd
and

and Mischievous and *morally Impossible* for him to Choose to do it. Which also is the very same Reason, why the most perfect Rational Creatures, Superiour to Men, *Cannot* do Evil; not because they want a *Natural Power* to perform the Material Action; but because it is *Morally Impossible*, that with a Perfect Knowledge of what is Best, and without any Temptation to Evil, their Will should determine it self to Choose to Act Foolishly and Unreasonably. I know, the Opposers of Liberty reply here, that there is no Difference between *Natural* and *Moral* Necessity; a Man free from all Pain of Body and Disorder of Mind, being (they say) under a *Natural* Impossibility of hurting or destroying himself; because neither his *Judgment* nor his *Will*, without some Impulse *External* to Both, for-

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can any more possibly be determined to any Action, than one Body can begin to move without being impelled by another. But this is forsaking the Argument drawn from the Necessity of the *Will's* following the *Understanding*, and recurs to the former Argument of the absolute Impossibility of there being any where a *First Principle of Motion* at all; which has been abundantly answered already.

The other Argument which I ^{The Cer-} said has also frequently been urg-^{tainty of} ed against the Possibility of Li-^{Divine} berty, is the *Certainty of the Di-* ^{Fore-} *vine Præscience.* But this also ^{knowledge} is entirely beside the Question. ^{not incon-} For if there be no Other Argu-^{sistent} ments, by which it can be pro-^{with the} ved antecedently, That All Actions ^{Liberty} are *Necessary*; 'Tis certain it can ne-^{of Mens} ver be made appear to follow from ^{Actions.}

Præscience alone, that they must be so. That is; if upon *Other Accounts* there be no Impossibility, but that the Actions of Men may be free; *the bare Certainty of the Divine Fore-Knowledge*, can never be Proved to destroy that Freedom: And Consequently the Certainty of *Præscience*, separated from *Other Arguments*, is altogether beside the Question of Liberty. As to the *Other Arguments*, usually intermingled with this Question; They have all, I think, been answered already: And now that, if upon other accounts there be no Impossibility for the Actions of Men to be free, *the bare Certainty of the Divine Fore-Knowledge* can never be proved to destroy that Freedom; is very Evident. For bare Foreknowledge, has no Influence at all in any Respect; nor affects in any mea-

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measure the manner of the Existence of Any Thing. All that the greatest Opposers of Liberty have ever urged, or can urge, upon this Head, amounts only to This ; that *Fore-Knowledge* implies *Certainty*, and *Certainty* implies *Necessity*. But Neither is it True, that *Certainty* implies *Necessity* ; neither does *Fore-Knowledge* imply any other *Certainty*, than such a *Certainty* only as would be equally in Things though there was no *Fore-Knowledge*.

For (1st) the *Certainty* of *Fore-Knowledge* does not Cause the *Certainty* of *Things*, but is it self founded on the Reality of their Existence. Whatever Now Is, 'tis *Certain* that it is ; and it was yesterday as *certainly* true, that the Thing *would be* to day, as it is Now *certain* that it *Is*. And this *Certainty* of Event is equally the same,

whether it be supposed that the Thing could be Fore-known, or not. For whatever at any Time *Is* ; it was *certainly* True from Eternity, as to the Event, that That Thing *would be* : And this Certain Truth of every future Event, would not at all have been the less, though there had been no such Thing as Fore-Knowledge. Bare Præscience therefore has no Influence at all upon any Thing ; nor contributes in the least towards the making it Necessary. We may illustrate this in some measure by the Comparison of our own Knowledge. We Know certainly that some Things are ; and when we Know that they are, they cannot but Be : Yet 'tis manifest our Knowledge does not at all affect the Things to make them more Necessary or more Certain. Now Fore-Knowledge in God, is
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the very same as Knowledge. All things are to Him as if they were equally present, to all the Purposes of Knowledge and Power. He Knows perfectly every thing that Is : And he fore-knows whatever shall be, in the same Manner as he Knows what Is. As therefore Knowledge has no Influence on Things that are; so neither has Fore-knowledge, on Things that shall be. 'Tis true : the Manner how God can foresee Future Things, without a Chain of Necessary Causes; is impossible for us to explain : But so also are Numberless other Things, which yet no Man doubts of the Truth of : And if there were any Strength in this Argument ; it would prove, not against *Liberty*, but against *Præscience* it self. For if these two things were really inconsistent, and one of them must

be destroyed; the introducing an absolute and universal Fatality, which evidently destroys all Religion and Morality, would tend more of the two to the Dishonour of God, than denying him a Fore-knowledge, which upon this Supposition would be impossible and imply a Contradiction to suppose him to have. But the Case is not thus. For tho' we cannot indeed explain the *manner* of God's foreseeing the Actions of Free Agents; yet thus much we know, that the bare Fore-knowledge of any Action, that would upon all other Accounts be Free, cannot alter or diminish that Freedom; it being evident that Fore-knowledge adds no other Certainty to any thing, than what it would equally have though there were no Fore-knowledge. Unless therefore we be antecedently certain, that nothing can possibly be free; and that Liberty

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ty is in it self absolutely an Inconsistent and Contradictory Notion ; (as I have above shown that it is not :) bare Fore-knowledge, which makes no alteration at all in any thing, will not be in any wise Inconsistent with Liberty ; how great Difficulty so ever there may be, in comprehending the *manner* of such Fore-knowledge. For if Liberty be in it self possible ; The bare *Fore-sight* of a free Action, *before it be done* ; is nothing different (to any Purpose in the present Question) from a simple *Knowledge* of it, *when it is done* : Both these Kinds of Knowledge, implying plainly a *Certainty only* of the Event, (which would be the same tho' there were no such Knowledge) and not at all any *Necessity* of the Thing.

For (2dly.) As *Fore-knowledge* implies not any other *Certainty*,

than such as would be equally in Things though there were *no Foreknowledge* : So neither does this *Certainty of Event*, in any sort imply *Necessity*. For, let a Fatalist *suppose*, (what he does *not yet grant*,) that there was in Man (as we assert) a Power of Beginning Motion, that is, of acting freely ; and let him suppose further, if he please, that those Actions could not possibly be foreknown : Will there not yet, notwithstanding this Supposition, be in the Nature of things the same *Certainty of Event* in every one of the Man's Actions, as if they were never so Fatal and Necessary ? For Instance : Suppose the Man by an internal Principle of Motion and an Absolute Freedom of Will, without any External Cause or Impulse at all, does some particular Action *to Day* ;
and

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and suppose it was not possible that this Action should have been fore-seen Yesterday ; was there not nevertheless the same *Certainty of Event*, as if it had been fore-seen ? That is ; would it not, notwithstanding the *supposed* Freedom, have been as *Certain a Truth* Yesterday, that this Action *was in Event to be performed to Day* (though supposed never so impossible to have been fore-known,) as it is now a *Certain and Infalible Truth* that it is performed ? Mere *Certainty of Event* therefore, does not in any measure imply *Necessity* : And consequently *Fore-knowledge*, however impossible to be explained as to the *Manner* of it, yet since 'tis evident it implies no other *Certainty* but only that *Certainty of Event* which the Thing would equally have without being fore-known,
'tis

'tis evident that *It* also implies no Necessity.

*Of the
Original
of Evil.*

And Now having, as I hope, sufficiently proved both the Possibility and the Real Existence of *Liberty* : I shall, from what has been said on this Head, draw only this One Inference ; that hereby we are inabled to Answer that Antient and Great Question, Ποθεν τὸ κακόν ; what is the Cause and Original of *Evil*. For *Liberty* implying a *Natural* Power of doing *Evil*, as well as *Good* ; and the Imperfect Nature of Finite Beings making it possible for them to abuse that their *Liberty* to an actual Commission of *Evil* ; and it being Necessary to the Order and Beauty of the Whole, and for displaying the Infinite Wisdom of the Creator, that there should be different and various degrees of Creatures, whereof

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whereof consequently some must be *less Perfect* than others ; Hence there necessarily arises a Possibility of Evil, notwithstanding that the Creator is infinitely Good. In short, thus : All that we call *Evil*, is either an *Evil of Imperfection*, as the *Want of certain Faculties and Excellencies* which other *Creatures* have ; or *Natural Evil*, as *Pain, Death*, and the like ; or *Moral Evil*, as all kind of *Vice*. The *First* of these, is not properly an Evil : For every Power, Faculty, or Perfection, which any Creature enjoys, being the Free Gift of God, which he was no more obliged to bestow, than he was to confer Being or Existence it self ; 'tis plain, the want of any certain Faculty or Perfection in any Kind of Creatures, which never belonged to their Nature, is no more an Evil to Them, than their

their never having been Created or brought into Being at all, could properly have been called an Evil. The *Second* Kind of Evil, which we call Natural Evil, is either a Necessary Consequence of the former ; as *Death*, to a Creature on whose Nature Immortality was never conferred ; and then 'tis no more properly an Evil, than the Former : Or else it is counterpoised in the whole with as Great or Greater Good ; as the *Afflictions and Sufferings* of *Good Men* ; and then also it is not properly an Evil : Or else lastly 'tis a *Punishment* ; and then 'tis a Necessary Consequent of the *Third* and last sort of Evil, viz. *Moral Evil* : And this arises wholly from the abuse of *Liberty* ; which God gave to his Creatures for other Purposes, and which 'twas reasonable and fit to give them for the Perfection
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on and Order of the whole Creation ; Only they, contrary to Gods Intention and Command, have abused what was Necessary for the Perfection of the whole, to the Corruption and Depravation of themselves ; And thus all Sorts of Evils have entred into the World, without any Diminution to the infinite Goodness of the Creator and Governour thereof.

XI. *The Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, must of Necessity be infinitely Wise.* This Proposition is evidently Consequent upon those that have already been proved ; and They being established, This, as admitting no further Dispute, needs not to be largely insisted upon. For nothing is more evident, than that an *Infinite, Omnipresent, Intelligent Being*, must
Know

That the Supreme Cause of all Things must be infinitely Wise.

Know perfectly *all things that Are*; and that He who alone is *Self-existent and Eternal*, the *Sole Cause and Author of all Things*; from whom alone all the Powers of all Things are derived, and on whom they continually depend; must also Know perfectly all those Powers, that is, *all Possibilities of Things to come*, and what in every respect is Best and Wisest to be done; and having *Infinite Power*, can never be controuled or prevented from doing what he so knows to be Fittest: From all which, it manifestly follows, that every Effect of the Supreme Cause, must be the Product of Infinite Wisdom. More particularly: The Supreme Being, because he is *Infinite*, must be every where present: And because he is an *Infinite Mind or Intelligence*; therefore where-ever he Is, his Knowledge Is, which is insepara-

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separable from his Being, and must therefore be infinite likewise : And where ever his Infinite Knowledge is, it must necessarily have a *full and perfect* Prospect of all things, and nothing can be concealed from its Inspection : He includes and surrounds every thing with his boundless Presence ; and penetrates every part of their Substance with his All-seeing Eye : So that the inmost Nature and Essence of all things, are perfectly Naked and Open to his View ; and even the deepest Thoughts of Intelligent Beings themselves, manifest in his sight. Further, All Things being not only present to him, but also entirely *Depending* upon him ; and having *received* both their Being it self, and all their Powers and Faculties *from Him* ; 'tis manifest that, as he knows all things that are, so he must

must likewise know all Possibilities of Things, that is, All Effects that *Can be*. For, being himself only Self-Existent, and having Alone *given* to all Things all the Powers and Faculties they are indued with; 'tis evident He must of Necessity know perfectly, what All and Each of those Powers and Faculties, which are *derived wholly from himself*; can possibly Produce: And Seeing at one boundless View, all the Possible Compositions and Divisions, Variations and Changes, Circumstances and Dependencies of Things; all their possible Relations one to another, and Dispositions or Fittnesses to certain and respective Ends; He must without Possibility of Error, know exactly what is Best and Popereſt in every one of the Infinite Possible Cases or Methods of Disposing Things; and under-stand

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stand perfectly how to Order and Direct the respective Means, to bring about what he so knows to be in its Kind or in the Whole the Best and Fittest in the End. This is what we mean by *Infinite Wisdom*. And having before shown, (which indeed is also Evident of it self,) that the Supreme Cause is moreover *All Powerful* ; so that He can no more be Prevented by Force or Opposition, than he can be hindred by Error or Mistake, from *Effecting* always what is absolutely Fittest and Wisest to be done : It follows undeniably that he is *actnally and effectnally*, in the Highest and most complete Sense, *Ininitely Wise* ; and that the World, and all Things therein, must be and are Effects of Infinite Wisdom. This is Demonstration *a priori*. The Proof *a posteriori*, of the Infinite Wisdom

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of

of God, from the Consideration of the Exquisite Perfection and Consummate Excellency of his Works ; is no less strong and undeniable : But I shall not enlarge upon this Argument ; because it has frequently already been accurately and strongly urged, to the everlasting shame and confusion of Atheists, by the ablest and learnedest Writers both of Antient and Modern Times. I shall here observe only this One Thing : That the Older the World grows, and the deeper Men inquire into Things, and the more Accurate Observations they make, and the more and greater Discoveries they find out ; the stronger this Argument continually grows : Which is a certain Evidence of its being founded in Truth. If *Galen* so many Ages ago, could find in the Construction and Constitution of
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the parts of a Humane Body, such undeniable marks of Contrivance and Design; as forced him *Then* to acknowledge and Admire the Wisdom of its Author: What would he have said, if he had known the *Late Discoveries* in Anatomy and Physick, the Circulation of the Blood, the exact Structure of the Heart and Brain, the Uses of Numberless Glands and Valves for the Secretion and Motion of the Juices in the Body, besides several Veins and other Vessels and Receptacles not at all known, or imagined so much as to have any Existence, *in his Days*; but which *Now* are discovered to serve the Wisest and most exquisite Ends imaginable? If the Arguments against the Belief of the Being of an All-wise Creator and Governor of the World, which *Epicurus* and his Follower *Lucretius* drew from the

Faults which they imagined they could Find in the Frame and Constitution of the *Earth*, were so Poor and Inconsiderable, that even in that Infancy of Natural Philosophy the Generality of Men, contemned and despised them as of no force: How would they have been alarmed, if they had lived in these Days; when those very things, which they thought to be Faults and Blunders in the Constitution of Things, are discovered to be very useful and of exceeding Benefit to the Preservation and Well-Being of the whole? And, to mention no more: If *Tully*, from the partial and very imperfect Knowledge in Astronomy, which *His Times* afforded, could be so confident of the Heavenly Bodies being Disposed and Moved by a Wise and Understanding Mind

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Mind, as to Declare, that in his Opinion, whoever asserted the contrary, was himself*

Void of all Understanding: What wou'd He have said, if he had know the *Modern Discoveries in Astronomy*? The *Immense Greatness* of the World;

* Cælestem ergo admirabilem ordinem incredibilemque constantiam, ex qua conservatio & salus omnium omnis oritur, qui vacare mente putat, is ipse mentis expers habendus est. *De Natura Deorum, lib. 2.*

(I mean of that Part of it, which falls under our Observation;) which is Now known to be as much Greater than what in his Time they imagined it to Be, as the World it self, according to their System, was Greater than *Archimedes's Sphere*? The *Exquisite Regularity* of all the Planets Motions, without Epicycles, Stations, Retrogradations, or any other Deviation or Confusion whatsoever? The *inexpressible Nicety* of the Adjustment of the Primary

Velocity and Original Direction of the *Annual* Motion of the Planets, with their Distance from the Central Body and their force of Gravitation towards it? The *wonderful Proportion* of the *Diurnal* Motion of the Earth and other Planets about their own Centers; for the Distinction of Light and Darkness, without that monstrously disproportionate Whirling of the whole Heavens, which the Antient Astronomers were forced to suppose? The *exact Accommodating* the * *Densities* of the

• Planetarum densitates fere sunt, ut radices diametrorum apparentium applicatæ ad diametros veras, hoc est, reciproce ut distantia Planetarum a sole, ductæ in radices diametrorum apparentium. Collocavit igitur Deus Planetas in diversis distantiiis a sole, ut quilibet pro gradu densitatis, calore solis majore vel minore fruatur. Newton. Princip. Lib. 3. Prop. 8.

Planets, to their Distances from the Sun, and consequently to the Proportion of Heat which each of them is to bear respectively; so that

neither

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neither Those which are nearest to the Sun, are destroyed by the Heat ; nor Those which are farthest off, by the Cold ; but each one enjoys a Temperature suited to its proper Uses, as the Earth is to ours ? The *Admirable Order, Number and Usefulness*, of the several *Moons*, (as I may very properly call them,) never dreamt of by Antiquity, but Now by the Help of Telescopes *clearly and distinctly* seen to move about their respective Planets ; and whose Motions are so *actly* Known, that their very Eclipses are as certainly calculated and foretold, as those of our own Moon ? The *strange Adjustment* of our Moon's Motion about its own Center once in a Month, with its Motion about the Earth in the same Period of Time, to such a degree of Exactness, that *by that*

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means

means the same Face is always Ob-
verted to the Earth without any
Sensible Variation? What, I say,
would *Tully*, that great Master of
Reason, have thought and said;
if these and other Newly Disco-
vered Instances of the Unexpres-
sible Accuracy and Wisdom of the
Works of God, had been found
out and Known in *His* Time?
Certainly Atheism, which *Then*
was infinitely unable to withstand
the Arguments drawn from this
Topick; must *Now*, upon the
additional Strength of these later
Observations, which are every
one an unanswerable Proof of the
incomprehensible Wisdom of the
Creator, be utterly ashamed to
show its Head. We *Now* see
with how great reason the Au-
thor of the Book of *Ecclesiasticks*,
after he had described the Beauty
of

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of the Sun and Stars, and all the then Visible Works of God in Heaven and Earth, concluded, *ch.* 43, *v.* 32, (as *We* after all the Discoveries of later Ages, may no doubt still truly say,) *There are yet hid greater things than these, and we have seen but a few of his Works.*

XII. Lastly, The Supreme Cause ^{The Su-} and Author of all Things, must of ^{preme} Necessity be a Being of Infinite Good- ^{Author} ness, Justice and Truth, and all o- ^{of all} ther Moral Perfections ; such as Be- ^{Things} come the Supreme Governour and ^{must be} Judge of the World. That there ^{infinitely} are different Relations of Things ^{Good,} one towards another, is as certain ^{Just and} as that there are Different Things ^{True.} in the World : That from these Different Relations of Different Things,

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Things, there necessarily arises an *Agreement* or *Disagreement* of some *Things* to others, or a *Fitness* or *Unfitness* of the Application of *Different Things* or *Different Relations* one to another ; is likewise as certain, as that there is any *Difference* in the *Nature* of *Things*, or that *Different Things* do Exist. Further, that there is a *Fitness* or *Suitableness* of certain *Circumstances* to certain *Persons*, and an *Unsuitableness* of Others, Founded in the *Nature* of *Things* and the *Qualifications* of *Persons*, antecedent to *Will* and to all *Arbitrary* or *Positive Appointment whatsoever* ; must unavoidably be acknowledged by every one, who will not affirm that 'tis equally *Fit* and *Suitable*, in the *Nature* and *Reason* of *Things*, that an *Innocent Being* should be extremely and eternally

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nally Miserable, as that it should be Free from such Misery. There is therefore such a Thing as *Fitness* and *Unfitness*, eternally, necessarily and unchangeably, in the Nature and Reason of Things. Now what these *Relations* of Things absolutely and Necessarily Are in Themselves; That also they *Appear to be*, to the Understanding of all Intelligent Beings; except Those only, who Understand Things to Be what they Are not, that is, whose Understandings are either very imperfect or very depraved. And by this *Understanding* or *Knowledge* of the Natural and Necessary Relations of Things, the *Actions* likewise of all Intelligent Beings are constantly Directed; (which *by the by* is the true Ground and Foundation of all Morality :) unless their *Will* be

be corrupted by particular *Interest* or *Affection*, or swayed by some unreasonable and prevailing Lust. The Supreme Cause therefore, and Author of all Things ; since (as has already been Proved) he must of necessity have Infinite *Knowledge*, and the Perfection of *Wisdom* ; so that 'tis absolutely impossible he should *Err* or be in any respect *Ignorant* of the True Relations and Fitness or Unfitness of Things, or be by any means *Deceived* or *Imposed* upon herein : And since he is likewise *Self-Existent*, Absolutely *Independent* and *All-Powerful* ; so that, having no want of any thing, 'tis impossible his *Will* should be influenced by any wrong *Affection* ; and, having no Dependence, 'tis impossible his *Power* should be limited by any Superior Strength : 'Tis evident He must

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must of Necessity (meaning, not a *Necessity of Fate*, but such a *Moral Necessity* as I before said was consistent with the most perfect Liberty,) *Do* always what he *Knows* to be *Fittest to be Done*: that is, He must *Act* always according to the strictest Rules of *Infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth*, and all other *Moral Perfections*. In Particular; The Supreme Cause must in the first place be infinitely *Good*; that is, he must have an unalterable Disposition to *Do* and to *Communicate* Good or Happiness: Because being Himself necessarily *Happy* in the Eternal enjoyment of his own *Infinite Perfections*, he cannot possibly have any other Motives to make any Creatures at all, but only that He may *Communicate* to Them His Own Perfections; according

cording to their *different Capacities*,
 arising from that *Variety of Na-*
tures, which it was Fit for *Infinite*
Wisdom to produce; and accord-
 ing to their *different Improvements*,
 arising from that *Liberty*, which is
 essentially Necessary to the Consti-
 tution of *Intelligent and Active*
Beings. That he must be Infi-
 nitely *Good*, appears likewise fur-
 ther from hence; that being
 Necessarily *All-Sufficient*, he must
 consequently be infinitely remov-
 ed from all *Malice* and *Envy*,
 and from all other Possible Cau-
 ses or Temptations of doing Evil;
 which, it is evident, can only be
 Effects of *Want and Weakness*, of
Imperfection or Depravation. A-
 gain; The Supreme Cause and
 Author of all things, must in like
 manner be infinitely *Just*: Be-
 cause the *Rule of Equity* being
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nothing else but the *Very Nature* of Things, and their *necessary Relations* one to Another; and the *Execution of Justice*, being nothing else but a *suiting the Circumstances of Things* to the *Qualifications of Persons*, according to that *Original Fitness and Agreeableness*, which I have before shown to be *Necessarily in Nature*, Antecedent to *Will and all Positive Appointment*; 'Tis evident that He who *Knows perfectly* this Rule of Equity, and necessarily *Judges of Things as they Are*; who has *complete Power* to Execute Justice according to that Knowledge, and *No possible Temptation* to deviate in the least therefrom; who can neither be *imposed upon* by any *Deceit*, nor *swayed* by any *Byass*, nor *awed* by any *Power*; must of Necessity do always

ways that which is *Right* ; without Iniquity, and without Partiality ; without Prejudice, and without Respect of Persons. Lastly ; That the Supreme Cause and Author of all things, must be *True* and *Faithful*, in all his *Declarations* and all his *Promises* ; is most evident : For the only Possible Reason of Falsifying, is either *Rashness* or *Forgetfulness*, *Inconstancy* or *Impotency*, *Fear of Evil* or *Hope of Gain* : From

* all which, an infinitely *Wise*, *All-sufficient* and *Good Being*, must of Necessity be infinitely removed; and consequently, as it is impossible for him to be deceived himself, so *

neither is it possible for Him in any wise to deceive Others. In a Word :

*** Οὐκ ἔστιν ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ θεοῦ
Ψεῦδος τοῦ — Κομῶν δὲ αὐτὸς ὁ
θεός αἰτλὸν καὶ ἀληθές, ἐν τῇ
ἐργῇ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ. Καὶ ὅτε
αὐτὸς μεδίσσεται, ἔτε ἄλλος
ἕξαπατᾷ, ἔτε κατὰ σφαν-
σίας, ἔτε κατὰ λόγους, ἔτε
κατὰ σημείων ποιητοῦς, ἔθ'
ὅπως ἐστὶ ὄναρ. *Plato de Ré-
pub. Lib. 2. Sub finem.*

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Word : All Evil and All Imperfection whatsoever, arise plainly either from *Shortness of Understanding, Defect of Power, or Faultiness of Will*; and this last, evidently from some *Impotency, Corruption or Depravation*; being nothing else, but a direct Chooing to Act contrary to the known Reason and Nature of Things : From all which, it being manifest that the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things, cannot but be infinitely Removed ; It follows undeniably, that he must of Necessity be a Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections.

To this Argumentation *a priori*, there can be opposed but one Objection that I know of, drawn on the contrary *a posteriori*, from Experience and Observation of the Unequal Distributions of Provi-

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dence in the World. But (besides the just Vindication of the Wisdom and Goodness of Providence in its Dispensations even with respect to this present World only, which *Plutarch* and other Heathen Writers have judiciously made) the Objection it self is entirely wide of the Question. For concerning the Justice and Goodness of God, (as of any Governour whatsoever,) no Judgment is to be made from a partial View of a few small Portions of his Dispensations, but from an Entire Consideration of the Whole; and consequently not only the short Duration of this present State, but moreover All that is past and that is still to come, must be taken into the Observation: and Then every thing will clearly appear just and right.

From this Account of the Moral

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ral Attributes of God, it follows,

1st. That though All the Acti-^{The Ne-}
ons of God, are entirely Free; ^{cessity of}
and consequently the Exercise of ^{Gods}
his Moral Attributes cannot be said ^{Moral}
to be Necessary, in the same Sense ^{Attri-}
of Necessity as his Existence and ^{butes con-}
Eternity are Necessary; yet these ^{sistent}
Moral Attributes are *really and tru-* ^{with per-}
ly Necessary, by such a Necessity, ^{fect Li-}
as, though it be not at all incon- ^{berty.}
sistent with Liberty, yet is equal-
ly Certain, Infallible, and to be
Depended upon, as even the Ex-
istence it self, or the Eternity of
God. For though nothing is more
Certain (*as has been already Pro-*
ved in the Ninth Proposition of this
Discourse) than that God Acts,
not necessarily, but voluntarily, with
particular intention and design,
knowing that he does Good, and
intending to do so, freely and
out of choice, and when he has

no other constraint upon him but this, that his Goodness inclines his Will to communicate himself and to do Good; so that the Divine Nature is under no Necessity, but such as is consistent with the most perfect Liberty and Freest Choice: (which is the Ground of all our Prayers and Thanksgivings;) yet it is nevertheless as *truly and absolutely impossible* for God not to do (or to do any thing contrary to,) what his Moral Attributes require him to do; as if he was really, not a Free, but a Necessary Agent. And the Reason hereof, is plain: Because Infinite Knowledge, Power, and Goodness in Conjunction, may, notwithstanding the most perfect Freedom and Choice, Act with altogether as much *Certainty and Unalterable Steadiness*; as even the Necessity of Fate can be supposed to do: Nay they cannot possibly but

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but so Act; because Free Choice in a Being of Infinite Knowledge, Power, and Goodness, can no more Choose to Act contrary to these Perfections; than Knowledge can be Ignorance, Power be Weakness, or Goodness Malice; So that Free Choice, in such a Being, may be as Certain a Principle of Action, as the Necessity of Fate. We may therefore as certainly and infallibly rely upon the *Moral*, as upon the *Natural* Attributes of God: It being as absolutely impossible for Him to Act contrary to the One, as to Devest himself of the Other; And as much a Contradiction, to suppose him choosing to Do any thing inconsistent with his Justice, Goodness and Truth; as to suppose him devested of Infinity, Power, or Existence. The One is contrary to the *Immediate and Absolute Necessity of his Nature*;

The other to the unalterable *Resolitude of his Will* : The One is in it self an *Immediate Contradiction in the Terms* ; The other is an express *Contradiction to the Necessary Perfections of the Divine Nature* : To suppose the One, is saying absolutely that *Something Is at the same Time that it is not* : To suppose the Other, is saying that *Infinite Knowledge can Act Ignorantly, Infinite Power Weakly, or that Infinite Wisdom and Goodness can Do Things Not Good or Wise to be done* : All which, are equally Great, and equally Manifest Absurdities. This, I humbly conceive, is a very Intelligible Account of the Moral Attributes of God ; satisfactory to the Mind, and without Perplexity and Confusion of Ideas. I might have said it at once, (as the Truth most certainly is,) that Justice, Goodness, and all the other Moral

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Attributes of God, are as *Essential* to the Divine Nature, as the Natural Attributes of Eternity, Infinity, and the like. But because all Atheistical Persons, after they are fully convinced that there must needs be in the Universe some one Eternal, Necessary, Infinite, and All-powerful Being; will still with unreasonable Obstinacy contend, that they can by no means see any necessary Connexion of Goodness, Justice, or any other Moral Attribute, with these Natural Perfections: Therefore I chose to endeavour to Demonstrate the Moral Attributes by a particular Deduction, in the manner I have now Done.

2dly. From hence it follows, ^{Of the} that though God is a most per- ^{Necessity}fectly free Agent, yet he cannot ^{of God's} but do always what is Best and ^{doing al-} ^{ways} Wisest in the whole. The Reason ^{what is} is evident: Because Perfect ^{Best and} ^{Fittest i} ^{the whole} Wis-

Wisdom and Goodness, are as Steddy and Certain Principles of Action, as Necessity it self: And an Infinitely Wise and Good Being, indued with the most perfect Liberty, can no more Choose to act in contradiction to Wisdom and Goodness; than a Necessary Being can Act contrary to the Necessity, by which it is acted: It being as great an Absurdity and Impossibility *in Choice*, for Infinite Wisdom to choose to act Unwisely, or Infinite Goodness to choose what is not Good; as it is in Nature, for absolute Necessity to fail of producing its necessary Effect. There was indeed no *Necessity in Nature*, that God should at first Create such Beings as he has Created, or indeed any Being at all; because He is in Himself infinitely Happy, and All-sufficient: There was also no *Necessity in Nature* that he should
preserve

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preserve and continue Things in Being, after they were created; because He would be as Self-sufficient without their Continuance, as he was before their Creation: But it was Fit, and Wise, and Good, that Infinite Wisdom should Manifest, and Infinite Goodness Communicate it self: And therefore it was Necessary (*in the Sense of Necessity I am now speaking of*) that Things should be made at such Time, and continued so long, and indued with various Perfections in such Degrees, as Infinite Wisdom and Goodness saw it Wisest and Best that they should be: And *when* and *whilst* Things are in Being, the same Moral Perfections make it Necessary, that they should be disposed and governed according to the exactest and most unchangeable Laws of Eternal Justice, Goodness and Truth;

Truth; Because while *Things* and their *several Relations* are, they cannot but be what they are; and an infinitely *Wise Being*, cannot but know them to be what they are, and judge always rightly concerning the *several Fitnesses or Unfitnesses* of them; and an infinitely *Good Being*, cannot but choose to act always according to this *Knowledge of the respective Fitness of Things*: It being as truly impossible for such a *Free Agent*, as is absolutely incapable of being *Deceived or Depraved, to Choose*, by acting contrary to these *Laws*, to destroy its own *Perfections*; as for *Necessary Existence* to be able to destroy its own *Being*.

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Impossibi-
lity of his
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3dly. From hence it follows, that though God is both Perfectly Free, and also Infinitely Powerful, yet he cannot Possibly Do any Thing that is Evil. The Reason

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son of this also is Evident. Because, as 'tis manifest Infinite Power cannot Extend to Natural Contradictions, which imply a Destruction of that very Power, by which they must be supposed to be wrought ; so neither can it Extend to Moral Contradictions, which imply a Destruction of some other Attributes, as necessarily belonging to the Divine Nature, as Power. I have already shewn, that Justice, Goodness and Truth, are necessarily in God ; even as necessarily, as Power and Understanding, and Knowledge of the Nature of Things : 'Tis therefore as Impossible and Contradictory, to suppose *his Will should Choose* to Do any thing contrary to Justice, Goodness or Truth ; as that *his Power should be Able* to Do any thing inconsistent with Power. 'Tis no Diminution of Power, not to be able

able to Do things which are no Object of Power : And 'tis in like manner no Diminution either of Power or Liberty, to have such a Perfect and Unalterable Rectitude of Will, as never Possibly to Choose to do any thing inconsistent with that Rectitude.

That Liberty is not in it self an Imperfection, but a Perfection.

4thly. From hence it follows, that Liberty, properly speaking, is not in it self an Imperfection, but a Perfection. For it is in the highest and completest degree, in God Himself; Every Act, wherein he Exercises any Moral Attribute, as Goodness, Justice or Truth, proceeding from the most Perfect Liberty and Freest Choice; without which, Goodness would not be Goodness, nor Justice and Truth any Excellencies; these things, in the very Idea and Formal Notion of them, utterly excluding All Necessity. It has indeed

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deed been commonly taught, that Liberty is a great Imperfection; because it is the Occasion of all Sin and Misery: But, if we will speak properly, 'tis not Liberty that exposes us to Misery, but only the Abuse of Liberty. 'Tis True; Liberty makes Men capable of Sin, and consequently liable to Misery; neither of which they could possibly be, without Liberty: But he that will say every thing is an Imperfection, by the Abuse of which a Creature may become more unhappy, than if God had never given it that Thing at all; must say that a Stone is a more excellent and perfect Creature than Man, because it is not capable of making it self miserable, as Man is: And by the same Argument, Reason and Knowledge, and every other Perfection, nay even Existence

stence it self, will be Proved to be an Imperfection; because it is That without which a Creature could not be miserable. The Truth therefore is; The Abuse of Liberty, that is, the Corruption and Depravation of That, without which no Creatures could be happy, is the alone Cause of their Misery: But as for Liberty it self, it is a great Perfection: And the more Perfect any Creature is, the more Perfect is its Liberty: And the Perfectest Liberty of all, is such a Liberty, as can never by any Ignorance, Deceit or Corruption, be byassed or diverted from Choosing, what is the Proper Object of Free Choice, the greatest Good.

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5thly. From hence it follows, that though probably no Rational Creature can be in a strict Philosophical Sense *Impeccable*; yet we may

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may easily conceive, how God can place such Creatures, as he judges worthy of so Excellent a Gift; in such a State of Knowledge and near Communion with himself, where Goodness and Holiness shall appear so amiable, and where they shall be exempt from all means of Temptation and Corruption; that it shall never be possible for them, notwithstanding the Natural Liberty of their Will, to be seduced from their unchangeable Happiness in the Everlasting Choice and Enjoyment of their greatest Good: Which is the State of Good Angels, and of the Saints in Heaven.

Lastly, from what has been said upon this Head, it follows, that the true Ground and Foundation of all Eternal Moral Obligations, is this; that the same Reasons, *viz:* the forementioned necessary and

That the Grounds of all Moral Obligations are eternal and necessary, and depend not on any Laws.

and eternal *Different Relations* which *Different Things* bear one to another; and the consequent *Fitness* or *Unfitness* of the Application of different Things or different Relations one to another, unavoidably arising from that Difference of the Things themselves; these same Reasons, I say, which always and necessarily *do* determine the Will of God, as hath been before shown; *ought* also constantly to determine the Will of all Subordinate Intelligent Beings; And when they do not, then such Beings Setting up their own unreasonable Self-Will in opposition to the Nature and Reason of Things, endeavour (as much as in them lies) to make Things be what they are not and cannot be; which is the highest Presumption and greatest Insolence imaginable; an acting contrary to their own Reason and

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and Knowledge ; an attempting to destroy that Order by which the Universe Subsists ; and also by consequence an offering the highest affront imaginable to the Creatour of all Things, who himself governs all his Actions by these Rules, and cannot but require the same of all his reasonable Creatures. They who found all Moral Obligations ultimately in the *Will* of God, must recur at length to the same thing ; only with this difference, that they do not clearly explain how the Nature and Will of God himself must be necessarily Good and Just, as I have endeavoured to do. They who found all Moral Obligation only upon *Laws* made for the good of Societies, hold an Opinion which (besides that it is fully confuted by what has been already said concerning the eternal and necessary

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Difference of Things,) is moreover so directly and manifestly contradictory and inconsistent with it self, that it seems strange it should not have been more commonly taken notice of. For if there be no difference between Good and Evil, antecedent to all Laws ; there can be no reason given why any Laws should be made at all, when all things are naturally indifferent. To say that Laws are necessary to be made for the good of Mankind, is confessing that certain things tend to the good of Mankind, that is, to the preserving and perfecting their Nature ; which wise Men *therefore* think necessary to be established by Laws : And if the reason why certain things are established by wise and good Laws, is because those things tend to the good of Mankind ; 'tis manifest they were

were good, antecedent to their being confirmed by Laws : Otherwise, if they were not good, antecedent to all Laws; 'tis evident there could be no reason why such Laws should be made, rather than the contrary : Which is the greatest absurdity in the World.

AND now, from what has been said upon this Argument, I hope it is in the whole sufficiently clear, that the Being and Attributes of God, are to attentive and considering Minds, abundantly capable of just Proof and Demonstration; and that the Adversaries of God and Religion, have not *Reason* on their side, (to which they would pretend to be strict Adherers,) but merely vain Confidence, and great Blindness and Prejudice; when

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they would have it be thought, that in the Fabrick of the World God has left himself wholly without Witness; and that all the Arguments of Nature, are on the side of Atheism and Irreligion. Some Men, I know, there are, who having never turned their Thoughts to Matters of this Nature, Think that these Things are all absolutely above our Comprehension; and that we Talk about we know not what, when we dispute about these Questions: But since the most considerable Atheists that ever appeared in the World, and the Pleaders for Universal Fatality, have all thought fit to argue in this Way, in their Attempts to remove the first Foundations of Religion; it is Reasonable and Necessary that they should be opposed in their own Way; it being most certain, that no Argumentation,

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tation, of what kind soever, can possibly be made use of on the side of Errour, but may also be used with much greater Advantage, on the behalf of Truth.

2. From what has been said on this Argument, we may see how it comes to pass, that though nothing is so certain and undeniable, as the Necessary Existence of God, and the Consequent Deduction of all his Attributes; yet Men, who have never attended to the Evidence of Reason and the Notices that God hath given us of Himself, may Easily be in great measure ignorant of Both. That the three Angles of a Triangle are Equal to two right ones, is so certain and evident, that whoever affirms the contrary, affirms what may very easily be reduced to an Express Contradiction: yet whoever bend not their Minds to consider

sider it at all, may easily be ignorant of this and numberless other the like Mathematical and most infallible Truths.

3. Yet the Notices that God has been pleased to give us of himself, are so many and so obvious; in the Constitution, Order, Beauty and Harmony of the several Parts of the World; in the Frame and Structure of our own Bodies, and the wonderful Powers and Faculties of our Souls; in the unavoidable Apprehensions of our own Minds; and the common Consent of all other Men; in every thing within us, and every thing without us; that no Man of the meanest Capacity and greatest Disadvantages whatsoever, with the slightest and most superficial Observation of the Works of God, and the lowest and most obvious attendance to the Reason
of

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of Things, can be ignorant of *Him*, but he must be utterly without excuse. He may not indeed be able to understand or be affected by Nice and Metaphysical Demonstrations of the Being and Attributes of God: But then for the same Reason, he is obliged also not to suffer himself to be shaken and unsettled, by the subtle Sophistries of Sceptical and Atheistical Men; which he cannot perhaps answer, because he cannot understand; But he is bound to adhere to those Things which he knows, and those Reasonings he is capable to judge of; which are abundantly sufficient to determine and to guide the Practice of sober and considering Men.

4. But this is not all. God has moreover finally, by a clear and express Revelation of Himself, brought down from Heaven
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by his own Son, our Blessed Lord and Redeemer; and suited to every Capacity and Understanding; put to Silence the Ignorance of Foolish, and the Vanity of Sceptical and Profane Men: and by Declaring to us Himself his own Nature and Attributes, has effectually prevented all Mistakes, which the Weakness of our Reason, the Negligence of our Application, the Corruption of our Nature, or the False Philosophy of wicked and Profane Men, might have led us into; and so has infallibly furnished us with sufficient Knowledge, to enable us to perform our Duty in this Life, and to obtain our Happiness in that which is to come. But this exceeds the Bounds of my present Subject, and deserves to be handled in a particular Discourse.

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